HISTORY: The Measure of Honour [oral exam]
The Measure of Honour
by Anjali Pai, 8 October 2007
"There is a law among the Romans, that whoever desires the honour of a triumph must stay without the city and expect his answer. And another, that those who stand for the consulship shall appear personally upon the place." -- Plutarch, Caesar, p 861.
Though the intention of this statement may be innocent enough, the choice of wording suggests that there is something more fundamental at work within the workings of the Roman mind. Perhaps this is Plutarch's interpretation of history, but since history is simply that, a series of interpretations by those individuals who take it upon themselves to write it, it is impossible to separate the facts from the words themselves, despite Polybius' insistence to the contrary. As such, it is curious that Plutarch would choose to set these two laws so prominently against each other, even if it is to demonstrate the impossibility of Caesar's position. Those who wish to stand for the consulship, in other words, must sacrifice an honour in order to do so. The idea of sacrificing honour brings to mind Thucydides and the unfortunate demise of Nicias; though surrendering itself carries with it no honour, the purpose of his surrender was for the good of his people, which presumably is the aim of any good leader. The sacrifice of one sort of honour for another seems a theme throughout this semester's readings, as seen also in Livy, where men are expected to join the military upon their honour as Roman citizens, but then are to fight for Rome regardless of their own feelings on the matter, thus fulfilling their duty and maintaining political honour while potentially remaining devoid of any personal honour.
The question, then, is how does one measure honour? Plutarch suggests that honour is measured internally, and only the individual can know what is considered honourable or not, but at the same time, this paradigm of thought is introduced in Caesar, which paints quite a different picture of honour, considering the fact that Caesar's motivations are not entirely honourable even if the outcomes are. It would seem, therefore, that the honour of an individual is measured differently from the honour of a leader; while the individual has the freedom to do things for his own sake, the leader's honour develops from the result of his actions. In addition, honour seems to differ depending on whether the leader is leading in a time of peace or of war; the Peloponnesian War is an example of this, as what is admired and thus considered honourable changes with circumstance, even if the individual code of honour and morality does not. However, this poses another problem, which is how one measures honour in the case of Livy, where the honour inherent in responsibility and the honour inherent in personal motivation may be in direct conflict. Is there honour in following a leader like Agamemnon, for example, because he is the king and his word is law, even if the reason for the battle is dishonourable and thus fought out of responsibility instead of honour by the soldiers? As for the leader, in such a case, would it be more honourable to fight in the name of a country's pride, or to acknowledge that a full-scale war over personal insult is not an honourable endeavour?
by Anjali Pai, 8 October 2007
"There is a law among the Romans, that whoever desires the honour of a triumph must stay without the city and expect his answer. And another, that those who stand for the consulship shall appear personally upon the place." -- Plutarch, Caesar, p 861.
Though the intention of this statement may be innocent enough, the choice of wording suggests that there is something more fundamental at work within the workings of the Roman mind. Perhaps this is Plutarch's interpretation of history, but since history is simply that, a series of interpretations by those individuals who take it upon themselves to write it, it is impossible to separate the facts from the words themselves, despite Polybius' insistence to the contrary. As such, it is curious that Plutarch would choose to set these two laws so prominently against each other, even if it is to demonstrate the impossibility of Caesar's position. Those who wish to stand for the consulship, in other words, must sacrifice an honour in order to do so. The idea of sacrificing honour brings to mind Thucydides and the unfortunate demise of Nicias; though surrendering itself carries with it no honour, the purpose of his surrender was for the good of his people, which presumably is the aim of any good leader. The sacrifice of one sort of honour for another seems a theme throughout this semester's readings, as seen also in Livy, where men are expected to join the military upon their honour as Roman citizens, but then are to fight for Rome regardless of their own feelings on the matter, thus fulfilling their duty and maintaining political honour while potentially remaining devoid of any personal honour.
The question, then, is how does one measure honour? Plutarch suggests that honour is measured internally, and only the individual can know what is considered honourable or not, but at the same time, this paradigm of thought is introduced in Caesar, which paints quite a different picture of honour, considering the fact that Caesar's motivations are not entirely honourable even if the outcomes are. It would seem, therefore, that the honour of an individual is measured differently from the honour of a leader; while the individual has the freedom to do things for his own sake, the leader's honour develops from the result of his actions. In addition, honour seems to differ depending on whether the leader is leading in a time of peace or of war; the Peloponnesian War is an example of this, as what is admired and thus considered honourable changes with circumstance, even if the individual code of honour and morality does not. However, this poses another problem, which is how one measures honour in the case of Livy, where the honour inherent in responsibility and the honour inherent in personal motivation may be in direct conflict. Is there honour in following a leader like Agamemnon, for example, because he is the king and his word is law, even if the reason for the battle is dishonourable and thus fought out of responsibility instead of honour by the soldiers? As for the leader, in such a case, would it be more honourable to fight in the name of a country's pride, or to acknowledge that a full-scale war over personal insult is not an honourable endeavour?