Fighting an Insurgency
I guess first of all the usual caveats - I am by no means an expert on counter-insurgency operations. Or even infantry operations. I'm also coming up with this stuff without tying it to our own logistics and financing, so it may not even be practical. Oh, and I am pulling bits and pieces I've heard from places - like the whole 'inkblot' counterinsurgency plan of creating safe havens and then spreading them out like an inkblot (which seems to make a lot of sense to me, in many different ways.)
In Iraq we are trying to balance the need to fight a war with the need to develop an open and democratic society - which means, for example, that anything that detracts from that and seems to rely only on brute force is kind of detrimental to the larger fight. We want to put bad guys through the legal system, create criminal records and try them legally, for example.
Still, I think the one of the key 'targets' is the perception of control. That is what insurgents attack, every time they fire mortars or blow up a convoy. They are attacking the perception that we are in control, that we can stop them, arrest them, and keep them from attacking.
Unfortunately, a perception of control (or lack thereof) can spiral out of hand rather quickly. The criminals know what they are doing, who they are attacking, and where. Which leaves the other side reacting after the fact all too often. It takes time to track down who might have been able to support an attack, time to track down the networks - and you can't always catch all of them even then. Its a classic Leviathan problem (which all governments could face. Governments always have fewer people and often are less knowledgeable than those immediately in an area) - where we don't know who is bad or not, and are likely to make errors of either not arresting bad guys (leaving them free to attack again), arresting good guys by mistake (and potentially alienating them in turn), and risking corruption with those we trust in identifying bad guys (not just because the Iraq army has those problems, but informants often have ulterior motives). And of course if the news is right about the insurgent supply channels becoming more solid, and their ability to sustain themselves despite our efforts is strengthening, then it shows that time is a big factor in the tactics you choose. Things you do early on may be too little too late after the insurgency has had time to blossom.
Which is sort of a fancy way of saying that regaining a sense of control right now would take a hella lot more effort than if we'd had it right at the beginning, and yet the need to seem like the 'good guys' is also even more important now.
I think on the flip side, though is that people are getting tired of feeling like they are living in fear, and might possibly support harsher measures if it would offer some feeling of safety. Which means a concerted effort to create 'safe havens' where we start off with heavy-handed control, perhaps consider measures like a one time house to house search for IED munitions and other weapons before making a place a 'safe haven', and then creating tight security for everyone entering - and then expanding those borders and areas gradually - coupled with a Psyop campaign explaining what we are doing, why, and exactly how - just might work. Then you'd have to bring in the Iraqis to maintain control, but with a heavy US presence at the beginning and establish penalties for ethnic favoritism and corruption, and start turning the center of these safe havens over to them.
Of course, that would be a pretty manpower intensive effort I think. And there still would be all the problems we have now of maintaining secure checkpoints and whatnot. And I'm not sure how easy it would be to make a true 'safe haven' in urban areas where there are multiple routes from one place to another, nor how good our searches would be at rooting out potential threats, never mind whether insurgents within the safe haven would be able to find more creative ways of attacking. Still, if you also tie in a campaign linking these guys to the lack of safety and extending the US presence (and other incentives) perhaps we can get them to turn these guys in for us. And you'd need a heavy police presence within these safe havens at the beginning, to help forestall sectarian violence. You'd also still have to keep on trucking with turning things over to the Iraqis and building trust in their institutions.
In Iraq we are trying to balance the need to fight a war with the need to develop an open and democratic society - which means, for example, that anything that detracts from that and seems to rely only on brute force is kind of detrimental to the larger fight. We want to put bad guys through the legal system, create criminal records and try them legally, for example.
Still, I think the one of the key 'targets' is the perception of control. That is what insurgents attack, every time they fire mortars or blow up a convoy. They are attacking the perception that we are in control, that we can stop them, arrest them, and keep them from attacking.
Unfortunately, a perception of control (or lack thereof) can spiral out of hand rather quickly. The criminals know what they are doing, who they are attacking, and where. Which leaves the other side reacting after the fact all too often. It takes time to track down who might have been able to support an attack, time to track down the networks - and you can't always catch all of them even then. Its a classic Leviathan problem (which all governments could face. Governments always have fewer people and often are less knowledgeable than those immediately in an area) - where we don't know who is bad or not, and are likely to make errors of either not arresting bad guys (leaving them free to attack again), arresting good guys by mistake (and potentially alienating them in turn), and risking corruption with those we trust in identifying bad guys (not just because the Iraq army has those problems, but informants often have ulterior motives). And of course if the news is right about the insurgent supply channels becoming more solid, and their ability to sustain themselves despite our efforts is strengthening, then it shows that time is a big factor in the tactics you choose. Things you do early on may be too little too late after the insurgency has had time to blossom.
Which is sort of a fancy way of saying that regaining a sense of control right now would take a hella lot more effort than if we'd had it right at the beginning, and yet the need to seem like the 'good guys' is also even more important now.
I think on the flip side, though is that people are getting tired of feeling like they are living in fear, and might possibly support harsher measures if it would offer some feeling of safety. Which means a concerted effort to create 'safe havens' where we start off with heavy-handed control, perhaps consider measures like a one time house to house search for IED munitions and other weapons before making a place a 'safe haven', and then creating tight security for everyone entering - and then expanding those borders and areas gradually - coupled with a Psyop campaign explaining what we are doing, why, and exactly how - just might work. Then you'd have to bring in the Iraqis to maintain control, but with a heavy US presence at the beginning and establish penalties for ethnic favoritism and corruption, and start turning the center of these safe havens over to them.
Of course, that would be a pretty manpower intensive effort I think. And there still would be all the problems we have now of maintaining secure checkpoints and whatnot. And I'm not sure how easy it would be to make a true 'safe haven' in urban areas where there are multiple routes from one place to another, nor how good our searches would be at rooting out potential threats, never mind whether insurgents within the safe haven would be able to find more creative ways of attacking. Still, if you also tie in a campaign linking these guys to the lack of safety and extending the US presence (and other incentives) perhaps we can get them to turn these guys in for us. And you'd need a heavy police presence within these safe havens at the beginning, to help forestall sectarian violence. You'd also still have to keep on trucking with turning things over to the Iraqis and building trust in their institutions.