faith and reason
Rabbi Donniel Hartman gave a fascinating talk called "Faith and Reason".
This is not a full description of that talk (too much). It's not really
even a complete summary, as I'm skipping past a bunch of stage-setting.
This is more of a partial summary plus reaction all rolled into one.
(I'll try to be clear when he's talking and when I am.)
R. Hartman argues that in a world in which we have many choices, where we can choose to associate with "people like us" (whatever that means), we are free to choose how to respond to religion. In a previous talk he suggested that many choose atheism, usually negative atheism (I don't know that God exists) or practical atheism (whether God exists doesn't affect what I do) rather than positive atheism (I know that God doesn't exist). In this talk he suggested that a barrier to faith is the baggage you think you'll have to accept. Many, he thinks, make assumptions about that baggage -- the things we will have to believe or at least accept -- based on pediatric perceptions of religion. He asks: If I choose the presumption of faith do I have to leave my brain at the door?
At this point he clarified some terminology. Let us not confuse reason and rationality, he says. What's the difference? That which is rational is objectively true: (his examples) 1+1=2, murder is wrong. Objective truth can be wrong (refined by subsequent knowledge), but it is not a matter of opinion. You don't talk about something being rational "to me". Rational just is. Reason, on the other hand, is personal, and it is just as important. The public discourse, he says, is often about faith and rationality (e.g. creationism versus evolution), but the Jewish discourse should be about faith and reason.
What follows is drawn from the Rambam (Maimonides). I'm not sure if the previous paragraph is. So now you have me describing R. Hartman describing the Rambam; he gave us a packet of sources that I haven't fully reviewed yet, so don't assume that anything I write here is really the Rambam and not either R. Hartman or my misunderstanding without verification.
At this point we reviewed part of an argument made by the Rambam against Aristotle's position that the world is eternal (has always existed, meaning it wasn't created). This is Guide to the Perplexed II chapter 25. The interesting thing about this argument is that he does not draw it from torah. To the Rambam, R. Hartman says, torah is not a source of scientific truth. (If that's a correct understanding, I see why he was called a heretic in his time. And I'm not sure what changed later.)
There cannot be a contradiction between religion and rationality, according to the Rambam. If you see a contradiction, then it is religion, not the world, that you do not understand.
The Rambam then goes on to argue (chapter 31) that every commandment has a purpose, either to direct us to do something good or to prevent us from doing something bad, bringing proof-texts. R. Hartman argued that to take a "leap of faith" is to leap over your reason; you might think a law has no purpose, but can you consider the idea that it does? (Or, a point he raised but didn't address: what if you think a law is actively unreasonable? I know the Rambam says you're a sinner if you dispute even one of the mitzvot.)
Around this point someone in the audience countered this "maybe it's reasonable and you just don't see it" argument with the red heifer, from this past week's torah portion. Really? This makes sense? R. Hartman said that the test of silliness is killing religion. A perfect God cannot give a perfect torah to an imperfect people, so the question is not just "is this reasonable" but "was this ever reasonable". This is the Rambam's argument supporting korbanot (animal sacrifices); he argues that God never wanted that, but it was necessary at that time to move the people along -- they would not have accepted a God who didn't call for this. Torah has to reflect human reason, which is always grounded in time. (I think that was R. Hartman, not the Rambam.)
(A question I've had since learning that Rambam (years ago), by the way, is whether that means the Rambam thinks there will not be a third temple with resumption of the korbanot (and did he pray for that like the traditional liturgy does now?).)
So, R. Hartman says the Rambam says, so long as a commandment doesn't seem stupid (unreasonable), then even if I don't understand it maybe I can go along with it anyway. If I understand that it has a purpose even if it might not now, isn't that enough?
In his introduction to tractate Sanhedrin (I think), the Rambam says that God taught us commandments, which are virtues, and vices, which are sins. A decent person should cultivate the former and avoid the latter, which will effect a change in him, raising him above the level of the animals. R. hartman uses this text to argue that faith doesn't create a duty; rather, it attunes us to that which will make us better people. (Not addressed: non-Jews, who are also above the level of the animals.)
R. Hartman concluded this talk by saying that faith must be rational, and we should use the gates of interpretation that God gave us. The meaning and depth of our tradition can inspire, and we shouldn't be shy about going on that journey. Finding meaning, to be in accordance with reason, requires work and choices. Some mitzvot might not pass muster, but others we might be able to do for tradition and others might seem reasonable. We have to do the work to figure it out.
R. Hartman argues that in a world in which we have many choices, where we can choose to associate with "people like us" (whatever that means), we are free to choose how to respond to religion. In a previous talk he suggested that many choose atheism, usually negative atheism (I don't know that God exists) or practical atheism (whether God exists doesn't affect what I do) rather than positive atheism (I know that God doesn't exist). In this talk he suggested that a barrier to faith is the baggage you think you'll have to accept. Many, he thinks, make assumptions about that baggage -- the things we will have to believe or at least accept -- based on pediatric perceptions of religion. He asks: If I choose the presumption of faith do I have to leave my brain at the door?
At this point he clarified some terminology. Let us not confuse reason and rationality, he says. What's the difference? That which is rational is objectively true: (his examples) 1+1=2, murder is wrong. Objective truth can be wrong (refined by subsequent knowledge), but it is not a matter of opinion. You don't talk about something being rational "to me". Rational just is. Reason, on the other hand, is personal, and it is just as important. The public discourse, he says, is often about faith and rationality (e.g. creationism versus evolution), but the Jewish discourse should be about faith and reason.
What follows is drawn from the Rambam (Maimonides). I'm not sure if the previous paragraph is. So now you have me describing R. Hartman describing the Rambam; he gave us a packet of sources that I haven't fully reviewed yet, so don't assume that anything I write here is really the Rambam and not either R. Hartman or my misunderstanding without verification.
At this point we reviewed part of an argument made by the Rambam against Aristotle's position that the world is eternal (has always existed, meaning it wasn't created). This is Guide to the Perplexed II chapter 25. The interesting thing about this argument is that he does not draw it from torah. To the Rambam, R. Hartman says, torah is not a source of scientific truth. (If that's a correct understanding, I see why he was called a heretic in his time. And I'm not sure what changed later.)
There cannot be a contradiction between religion and rationality, according to the Rambam. If you see a contradiction, then it is religion, not the world, that you do not understand.
The Rambam then goes on to argue (chapter 31) that every commandment has a purpose, either to direct us to do something good or to prevent us from doing something bad, bringing proof-texts. R. Hartman argued that to take a "leap of faith" is to leap over your reason; you might think a law has no purpose, but can you consider the idea that it does? (Or, a point he raised but didn't address: what if you think a law is actively unreasonable? I know the Rambam says you're a sinner if you dispute even one of the mitzvot.)
Around this point someone in the audience countered this "maybe it's reasonable and you just don't see it" argument with the red heifer, from this past week's torah portion. Really? This makes sense? R. Hartman said that the test of silliness is killing religion. A perfect God cannot give a perfect torah to an imperfect people, so the question is not just "is this reasonable" but "was this ever reasonable". This is the Rambam's argument supporting korbanot (animal sacrifices); he argues that God never wanted that, but it was necessary at that time to move the people along -- they would not have accepted a God who didn't call for this. Torah has to reflect human reason, which is always grounded in time. (I think that was R. Hartman, not the Rambam.)
(A question I've had since learning that Rambam (years ago), by the way, is whether that means the Rambam thinks there will not be a third temple with resumption of the korbanot (and did he pray for that like the traditional liturgy does now?).)
So, R. Hartman says the Rambam says, so long as a commandment doesn't seem stupid (unreasonable), then even if I don't understand it maybe I can go along with it anyway. If I understand that it has a purpose even if it might not now, isn't that enough?
In his introduction to tractate Sanhedrin (I think), the Rambam says that God taught us commandments, which are virtues, and vices, which are sins. A decent person should cultivate the former and avoid the latter, which will effect a change in him, raising him above the level of the animals. R. hartman uses this text to argue that faith doesn't create a duty; rather, it attunes us to that which will make us better people. (Not addressed: non-Jews, who are also above the level of the animals.)
R. Hartman concluded this talk by saying that faith must be rational, and we should use the gates of interpretation that God gave us. The meaning and depth of our tradition can inspire, and we shouldn't be shy about going on that journey. Finding meaning, to be in accordance with reason, requires work and choices. Some mitzvot might not pass muster, but others we might be able to do for tradition and others might seem reasonable. We have to do the work to figure it out.