Hugo Chavez...I believe he's my newest hero!
(recommendation: read Open Veins of Latin America)
>Two fingers to America
>
>He's a friend of Fidel Castro, a fierce critic of the war in Iraq, and
>wants to spread revolutionary fervour throughout South America.
>Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, has long been a thorn in the side
>of the US - a fact highlighted this week when televangelist Pat
>Robertson called for his assassination. Richard Gott on a man at war
>with the White House
>
>Richard Gott
>Thursday August 25 2005
>The Guardian
>
>
>Hugo Chávez, the president of Venezuela, is a genial fellow with a
good
>sense of humour and a steely political purpose. As a former military
>officer, he is accustomed to the language of battle and he thrives
>under attack. He will laugh off this week's suggestion by Pat
>Robertson, the US televangelist, that he should be assassinated, but
he
>will also seize on it to ratchet up the verbal conflict with the
United
>States that has lasted throughout his presidency.
>
>Chávez, now 51, is the same age as Tony Blair, and after nearly seven
>years as president he has been in power for almost as long. But there
>the similarities end. Chávez is a man of the left and, like most Latin
>Americans with a sense of history, he is distrustful of the United
States.
>Free elections in Latin America have often thrown up radical
>governments that Washington would like to see overthrown, and the
>Chávez government is no exception to this rule.
>
>Chávez is a genuinely revolutionary figure, one of those
>larger-than-life characters who surface regularly in the history of
>Latin America - and achieve power perhaps twice in a hundred years. He
>wants to change the history of the continent. His close friend and
role
>model is Fidel Castro, Cuba's long-serving leader. The two men meet
>regularly, talk constantly on the telephone, and have formed a close
political and military alliance.
>Venezuela has deployed more than 20,000 Cuban doctors in its
>shanty-towns, and Cuba is the grateful recipient of cheap Venezuelan
>oil, replacing the subsidised oil it once used to receive from the
>Soviet Union. This, in the eyes of the US government, would itself be
a
>heinous crime that would put Chávez at the top of its list for
removal.
>The US has been at war with Cuba for nearly half a century, mostly
>conducted by economic means, and it only abandoned plans for Castro's
>direct overthrow after subscribing to a tacit agreement not to do so
>with the
> Soviet Union after the missile crisis of 1962.
>The Americans would have dealt with Chávez long ago had they not been
>faced by two crucial obstacles. First, they have been notably
>preoccupied in recent years in other parts of the world, and have
>hardly had the time, the personnel, or the attention span to deal with
the
charismatic colonel.
>Second, Venezuela is one of the principal suppliers of oil to the US
>market (literally so in that 13,000 US petrol stations are owned by
>Citgo, an extension of Venezuela\'s state oil company). Any hasty
>attempt to overthrow the Venezuelan government would undoubtedly
>threaten this oil lifeline, and Chávez himself has long warned that
his
>assassination would close down the pumps. With his popularity topping
>70% in the polls, he would be a difficult figure to dislodge.
>
>Chávez comes from the provinces of Venezuela, from the vast southern
>cattle lands of the Llanos that stretch down to the Apure and Orinoco
>river system. Of black and Indian ancestry, his parents were local
>schoolteachers, and he has inherited their didactic skills. His
talents
>first came to the fore when he joined the army and became a popular
>lecturer at the war college in Caracas. He is a brilliant
communicator,
>speaking for hours on television in a folksy manner that captivates
his
>admirers and irritates his opponents.
>
>He never stops talking and he never stops working. He has time for
>everyone and never forgets a face. For several years he travelled
>incessantly around the country, to keep an eye on what was going on.
>This was not mere electioneering, for he would talk for hours to those
>who had hardly a vote among them. He exhausts his cadres, his
>secretaries and his ministers. I have travelled with him and them into
>the deepest corners of the country, and then, after a 16-hour day, he
>would call the grey-faced cabinet together for an impromptu meeting to
>analyse what they had discovered and what measures they should take.
>
>There was always a touch of the 19th century about this frenetic
>activity, as though the president were still on horseback, and Castro
>is known to have warned Chávez not to absorb himself unduly in the
>minutiae of administration. "You are the president of Venezuela," he
is
>reported to have said, "not the mayor of Caracas." Chávez has taken
the
>advice to heart, and has become less the populist folk hero and more
>the impressive statesman. Concern about possible assassination has
long
>predated Robertson\'s outburst, and for the past two years Chávez has
>cut down his travels inside the country and been accompanied
everywhere
>by fearsome-looking guards.
>",1]);//-->
>The Americans would have dealt with Chávez long ago had they not been
>faced by two crucial obstacles. First, they have been notably
>preoccupied in recent years in other parts of the world, and have
>hardly had the time, the personnel, or the attention span to deal with
the
charismatic colonel.
>Second, Venezuela is one of the principal suppliers of oil to the US
>market (literally so in that 13,000 US petrol stations are owned by
>Citgo, an extension of Venezuela's state oil company). Any hasty
>attempt to overthrow the Venezuelan government would undoubtedly
>threaten this oil lifeline, and Chávez himself has long warned that
his
>assassination would close down the pumps. With his popularity topping
>70% in the polls, he would be a difficult figure to dislodge.
>
>Chávez comes from the provinces of Venezuela, from the vast southern
>cattle lands of the Llanos that stretch down to the Apure and Orinoco
>river system. Of black and Indian ancestry, his parents were local
>schoolteachers, and he has inherited their didactic skills. His
talents
>first came to the fore when he joined the army and became a popular
>lecturer at the war college in Caracas. He is a brilliant
communicator,
>speaking for hours on television in a folksy manner that captivates
his
>admirers and irritates his opponents.
>
>He never stops talking and he never stops working. He has time for
>everyone and never forgets a face. For several years he travelled
>incessantly around the country, to keep an eye on what was going on.
>This was not mere electioneering, for he would talk for hours to those
>who had hardly a vote among them. He exhausts his cadres, his
>secretaries and his ministers. I have travelled with him and them into
>the deepest corners of the country, and then, after a 16-hour day, he
>would call the grey-faced cabinet together for an impromptu meeting to
>analyse what they had discovered and what measures they should take.
>
>There was always a touch of the 19th century about this frenetic
>activity, as though the president were still on horseback, and Castro
>is known to have warned Chávez not to absorb himself unduly in the
>minutiae of administration. "You are the president of Venezuela," he
is
>reported to have said, "not the mayor of Caracas." Chávez has taken
the
>advice to heart, and has become less the populist folk hero and more
>the impressive statesman. Concern about possible assassination has
long
>predated Robertson's outburst, and for the past two years Chávez has
>cut down his travels inside the country and been accompanied
everywhere
>by fearsome-looking guards.
>Abroad, however, he is a frequent visitor to the capitals of Latin
>America, and he is widely perceived as the leader of the group of
>left-leaning presidents recently elected in Brazil, Argentina, and
>Uruguay, as well as the inspiration of the radicalised indigenous
>movements now clamouring at the gates of power in Bolivia and Ecuador.
>There is another touch of the 19th century here, for Chávez is a
>follower and promoter of the ideas and career of Simón Bolívar, the
>Venezuelan leader who brought the philosophy of the European
>Enlightenment and the French Revolution to Latin America, and
liberated
>much of the continent from Spanish rule. Chávez has labelled his
>movement the "Bolivarian Revolution", and he hopes that his political
ideas
will spread throughout the continent.
>
>This in itself would be alarming enough to the United States, had it
>the time to pay proper attention. Equally worrying for the Americans
is
>the time Chávez has devoted to the Middle East, successfully courting
>the governments that belong to Opec, the oil producers\' organisation,
>some of whom have been labelled by the Americans as "the axis of
evil".
>Today\'s high oil price has much to do with increased demand from
China
>and India, and from the Iraq war, but the spadework that has given
Opec
>fresh credibility was put in by Chávez. Soon he will be helping to
show
>the new Iranian president, using the Venezuelan example, how to
>increase the revenues of a state-owned oil company and channel them
>into programmes to help the poor.
>
>Chávez is widely popular today, but for much of his presidency he has
>been a contested, even a hated figure, arousing widespread discontent
>within Venezuela\'s traditional white elite. Yet although his rhetoric
>is revolutionary, his reforms have been moderate and social
democratic.
>He criticises the policies of "savage neo-liberalism" that have done
so
>much harm to the poorer peoples of Venezuela and Latin America in the
>past 20 years, yet the private sector is still alive and well. His
land
>reform is aimed chiefly at unproductive land and provides for
>compensation. His most obvious achievement, which should not have been
>controversial, has been to channel increased oil revenues into a fresh
>range of social projects that bring health and education into
neglected
shanty-towns.
>",1]);//-->
>Abroad, however, he is a frequent visitor to the capitals of Latin
>America, and he is widely perceived as the leader of the group of
>left-leaning presidents recently elected in Brazil, Argentina, and
>Uruguay, as well as the inspiration of the radicalised indigenous
>movements now clamouring at the gates of power in Bolivia and Ecuador.
>There is another touch of the 19th century here, for Chávez is a
>follower and promoter of the ideas and career of Simón Bolívar, the
>Venezuelan leader who brought the philosophy of the European
>Enlightenment and the French Revolution to Latin America, and
liberated
>much of the continent from Spanish rule. Chávez has labelled his
>movement the "Bolivarian Revolution", and he hopes that his political
ideas
will spread throughout the continent.
>
>This in itself would be alarming enough to the United States, had it
>the time to pay proper attention. Equally worrying for the Americans
is
>the time Chávez has devoted to the Middle East, successfully courting
>the governments that belong to Opec, the oil producers' organisation,
>some of whom have been labelled by the Americans as "the axis of
evil".
>Today's high oil price has much to do with increased demand from China
>and India, and from the Iraq war, but the spadework that has given
Opec
>fresh credibility was put in by Chávez. Soon he will be helping to
show
>the new Iranian president, using the Venezuelan example, how to
>increase the revenues of a state-owned oil company and channel them
>into programmes to help the poor.
>
>Chávez is widely popular today, but for much of his presidency he has
>been a contested, even a hated figure, arousing widespread discontent
>within Venezuela's traditional white elite. Yet although his rhetoric
>is revolutionary, his reforms have been moderate and social
democratic.
>He criticises the policies of "savage neo-liberalism" that have done
so
>much harm to the poorer peoples of Venezuela and Latin America in the
>past 20 years, yet the private sector is still alive and well. His
land
>reform is aimed chiefly at unproductive land and provides for
>compensation. His most obvious achievement, which should not have been
>controversial, has been to channel increased oil revenues into a fresh
>range of social projects that bring health and education into
neglected
shanty-towns.
>The hatred that he arouses in the old opposition parties, which have
>seen their membership and influence dwindle, lies more in ideology and
>racial antipathy than in material loss. Some opponents dislike his
>friendship with Castro, his verbal hostility to the United States, and
>his criticisms of the Catholic church, and some people still have a
>residual hostility to the fact that he staged an unsuccessful military
>coup in 1992 when a young colonel in the parachute regiment. Many
Latin
>Americans still find it difficult to come to terms with the idea of a
>progressive military man. But mostly they are alarmed by the way in
>which he has enfranchised the country\'s vast underclass, interrupting
>the cosy, US-influenced lifestyle of the white middle class with
>visions of a frightening world that lives beyond their apartheid-gated
communities.
>
>Over the past few years this anxious opposition has made several
>attempts to get rid of Chávez, with the tacit encouragement of
>Washington. They organised a coup in April 2002 that rebounded against
>them two days later when the kidnapped Chávez was returned to power by
>an alliance of the army and the people. They tried an economic coup by
>closing down the oil refineries, and this too was a failure. Last
>year\'s recall-referendum, designed to lead to a defeat for Chávez,
was
>an overwhelming victory for him. The local opposition, and by
extension
>the United States, have shot their final bolt. There is nothing left
in
>the locker, except of course assassination.
>
>The fingers of mad preachers are usually far from the button, but the
>untimely words of Pat Robertson, easily discounted in Washington and
>airily dismissed by the state department as "inappropriate", might yet
>wake an echo among zealots in Venezuela. A similar call was made last
>year by a former Venezuelan president. Assassinations may be easy to
>plan, and not difficult to accomplish. But their legacy is
>incalculable. The radical leader of neighbouring Colombia, Jorge
>Gaitán, was assassinated more than 50 years ago, in 1948. In terms of
>civil war and violence, the Colombians have been paying the price ever
>since. No one would wish that fate on Venezuela.
>",1]);//-->
>The hatred that he arouses in the old opposition parties, which have
>seen their membership and influence dwindle, lies more in ideology and
>racial antipathy than in material loss. Some opponents dislike his
>friendship with Castro, his verbal hostility to the United States, and
>his criticisms of the Catholic church, and some people still have a
>residual hostility to the fact that he staged an unsuccessful military
>coup in 1992 when a young colonel in the parachute regiment. Many
Latin
>Americans still find it difficult to come to terms with the idea of a
>progressive military man. But mostly they are alarmed by the way in
>which he has enfranchised the country's vast underclass, interrupting
>the cosy, US-influenced lifestyle of the white middle class with
>visions of a frightening world that lives beyond their apartheid-gated
communities.
>
>Over the past few years this anxious opposition has made several
>attempts to get rid of Chávez, with the tacit encouragement of
>Washington. They organised a coup in April 2002 that rebounded against
>them two days later when the kidnapped Chávez was returned to power by
>an alliance of the army and the people. They tried an economic coup by
>closing down the oil refineries, and this too was a failure. Last
>year's recall-referendum, designed to lead to a defeat for Chávez, was
>an overwhelming victory for him. The local opposition, and by
extension
>the United States, have shot their final bolt. There is nothing left
in
>the locker, except of course assassination.
>
>The fingers of mad preachers are usually far from the button, but the
>untimely words of Pat Robertson, easily discounted in Washington and
>airily dismissed by the state department as "inappropriate", might yet
>wake an echo among zealots in Venezuela. A similar call was made last
>year by a former Venezuelan president. Assassinations may be easy to
>plan, and not difficult to accomplish. But their legacy is
>incalculable. The radical leader of neighbouring Colombia, Jorge
>Gaitán, was assassinated more than 50 years ago, in 1948. In terms of
>civil war and violence, the Colombians have been paying the price ever
>since. No one would wish that fate on Venezuela.
>· Richard Gott is the author of Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian
>Revolution, published this month by Verso, price £9.99.
>
>Copyright Guardian Newspapers Limited
>
>Two fingers to America
>
>He's a friend of Fidel Castro, a fierce critic of the war in Iraq, and
>wants to spread revolutionary fervour throughout South America.
>Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, has long been a thorn in the side
>of the US - a fact highlighted this week when televangelist Pat
>Robertson called for his assassination. Richard Gott on a man at war
>with the White House
>
>Richard Gott
>Thursday August 25 2005
>The Guardian
>
>
>Hugo Chávez, the president of Venezuela, is a genial fellow with a
good
>sense of humour and a steely political purpose. As a former military
>officer, he is accustomed to the language of battle and he thrives
>under attack. He will laugh off this week's suggestion by Pat
>Robertson, the US televangelist, that he should be assassinated, but
he
>will also seize on it to ratchet up the verbal conflict with the
United
>States that has lasted throughout his presidency.
>
>Chávez, now 51, is the same age as Tony Blair, and after nearly seven
>years as president he has been in power for almost as long. But there
>the similarities end. Chávez is a man of the left and, like most Latin
>Americans with a sense of history, he is distrustful of the United
States.
>Free elections in Latin America have often thrown up radical
>governments that Washington would like to see overthrown, and the
>Chávez government is no exception to this rule.
>
>Chávez is a genuinely revolutionary figure, one of those
>larger-than-life characters who surface regularly in the history of
>Latin America - and achieve power perhaps twice in a hundred years. He
>wants to change the history of the continent. His close friend and
role
>model is Fidel Castro, Cuba's long-serving leader. The two men meet
>regularly, talk constantly on the telephone, and have formed a close
political and military alliance.
>Venezuela has deployed more than 20,000 Cuban doctors in its
>shanty-towns, and Cuba is the grateful recipient of cheap Venezuelan
>oil, replacing the subsidised oil it once used to receive from the
>Soviet Union. This, in the eyes of the US government, would itself be
a
>heinous crime that would put Chávez at the top of its list for
removal.
>The US has been at war with Cuba for nearly half a century, mostly
>conducted by economic means, and it only abandoned plans for Castro's
>direct overthrow after subscribing to a tacit agreement not to do so
>with the
> Soviet Union after the missile crisis of 1962.
>The Americans would have dealt with Chávez long ago had they not been
>faced by two crucial obstacles. First, they have been notably
>preoccupied in recent years in other parts of the world, and have
>hardly had the time, the personnel, or the attention span to deal with
the
charismatic colonel.
>Second, Venezuela is one of the principal suppliers of oil to the US
>market (literally so in that 13,000 US petrol stations are owned by
>Citgo, an extension of Venezuela\'s state oil company). Any hasty
>attempt to overthrow the Venezuelan government would undoubtedly
>threaten this oil lifeline, and Chávez himself has long warned that
his
>assassination would close down the pumps. With his popularity topping
>70% in the polls, he would be a difficult figure to dislodge.
>
>Chávez comes from the provinces of Venezuela, from the vast southern
>cattle lands of the Llanos that stretch down to the Apure and Orinoco
>river system. Of black and Indian ancestry, his parents were local
>schoolteachers, and he has inherited their didactic skills. His
talents
>first came to the fore when he joined the army and became a popular
>lecturer at the war college in Caracas. He is a brilliant
communicator,
>speaking for hours on television in a folksy manner that captivates
his
>admirers and irritates his opponents.
>
>He never stops talking and he never stops working. He has time for
>everyone and never forgets a face. For several years he travelled
>incessantly around the country, to keep an eye on what was going on.
>This was not mere electioneering, for he would talk for hours to those
>who had hardly a vote among them. He exhausts his cadres, his
>secretaries and his ministers. I have travelled with him and them into
>the deepest corners of the country, and then, after a 16-hour day, he
>would call the grey-faced cabinet together for an impromptu meeting to
>analyse what they had discovered and what measures they should take.
>
>There was always a touch of the 19th century about this frenetic
>activity, as though the president were still on horseback, and Castro
>is known to have warned Chávez not to absorb himself unduly in the
>minutiae of administration. "You are the president of Venezuela," he
is
>reported to have said, "not the mayor of Caracas." Chávez has taken
the
>advice to heart, and has become less the populist folk hero and more
>the impressive statesman. Concern about possible assassination has
long
>predated Robertson\'s outburst, and for the past two years Chávez has
>cut down his travels inside the country and been accompanied
everywhere
>by fearsome-looking guards.
>",1]);//-->
>The Americans would have dealt with Chávez long ago had they not been
>faced by two crucial obstacles. First, they have been notably
>preoccupied in recent years in other parts of the world, and have
>hardly had the time, the personnel, or the attention span to deal with
the
charismatic colonel.
>Second, Venezuela is one of the principal suppliers of oil to the US
>market (literally so in that 13,000 US petrol stations are owned by
>Citgo, an extension of Venezuela's state oil company). Any hasty
>attempt to overthrow the Venezuelan government would undoubtedly
>threaten this oil lifeline, and Chávez himself has long warned that
his
>assassination would close down the pumps. With his popularity topping
>70% in the polls, he would be a difficult figure to dislodge.
>
>Chávez comes from the provinces of Venezuela, from the vast southern
>cattle lands of the Llanos that stretch down to the Apure and Orinoco
>river system. Of black and Indian ancestry, his parents were local
>schoolteachers, and he has inherited their didactic skills. His
talents
>first came to the fore when he joined the army and became a popular
>lecturer at the war college in Caracas. He is a brilliant
communicator,
>speaking for hours on television in a folksy manner that captivates
his
>admirers and irritates his opponents.
>
>He never stops talking and he never stops working. He has time for
>everyone and never forgets a face. For several years he travelled
>incessantly around the country, to keep an eye on what was going on.
>This was not mere electioneering, for he would talk for hours to those
>who had hardly a vote among them. He exhausts his cadres, his
>secretaries and his ministers. I have travelled with him and them into
>the deepest corners of the country, and then, after a 16-hour day, he
>would call the grey-faced cabinet together for an impromptu meeting to
>analyse what they had discovered and what measures they should take.
>
>There was always a touch of the 19th century about this frenetic
>activity, as though the president were still on horseback, and Castro
>is known to have warned Chávez not to absorb himself unduly in the
>minutiae of administration. "You are the president of Venezuela," he
is
>reported to have said, "not the mayor of Caracas." Chávez has taken
the
>advice to heart, and has become less the populist folk hero and more
>the impressive statesman. Concern about possible assassination has
long
>predated Robertson's outburst, and for the past two years Chávez has
>cut down his travels inside the country and been accompanied
everywhere
>by fearsome-looking guards.
>Abroad, however, he is a frequent visitor to the capitals of Latin
>America, and he is widely perceived as the leader of the group of
>left-leaning presidents recently elected in Brazil, Argentina, and
>Uruguay, as well as the inspiration of the radicalised indigenous
>movements now clamouring at the gates of power in Bolivia and Ecuador.
>There is another touch of the 19th century here, for Chávez is a
>follower and promoter of the ideas and career of Simón Bolívar, the
>Venezuelan leader who brought the philosophy of the European
>Enlightenment and the French Revolution to Latin America, and
liberated
>much of the continent from Spanish rule. Chávez has labelled his
>movement the "Bolivarian Revolution", and he hopes that his political
ideas
will spread throughout the continent.
>
>This in itself would be alarming enough to the United States, had it
>the time to pay proper attention. Equally worrying for the Americans
is
>the time Chávez has devoted to the Middle East, successfully courting
>the governments that belong to Opec, the oil producers\' organisation,
>some of whom have been labelled by the Americans as "the axis of
evil".
>Today\'s high oil price has much to do with increased demand from
China
>and India, and from the Iraq war, but the spadework that has given
Opec
>fresh credibility was put in by Chávez. Soon he will be helping to
show
>the new Iranian president, using the Venezuelan example, how to
>increase the revenues of a state-owned oil company and channel them
>into programmes to help the poor.
>
>Chávez is widely popular today, but for much of his presidency he has
>been a contested, even a hated figure, arousing widespread discontent
>within Venezuela\'s traditional white elite. Yet although his rhetoric
>is revolutionary, his reforms have been moderate and social
democratic.
>He criticises the policies of "savage neo-liberalism" that have done
so
>much harm to the poorer peoples of Venezuela and Latin America in the
>past 20 years, yet the private sector is still alive and well. His
land
>reform is aimed chiefly at unproductive land and provides for
>compensation. His most obvious achievement, which should not have been
>controversial, has been to channel increased oil revenues into a fresh
>range of social projects that bring health and education into
neglected
shanty-towns.
>",1]);//-->
>Abroad, however, he is a frequent visitor to the capitals of Latin
>America, and he is widely perceived as the leader of the group of
>left-leaning presidents recently elected in Brazil, Argentina, and
>Uruguay, as well as the inspiration of the radicalised indigenous
>movements now clamouring at the gates of power in Bolivia and Ecuador.
>There is another touch of the 19th century here, for Chávez is a
>follower and promoter of the ideas and career of Simón Bolívar, the
>Venezuelan leader who brought the philosophy of the European
>Enlightenment and the French Revolution to Latin America, and
liberated
>much of the continent from Spanish rule. Chávez has labelled his
>movement the "Bolivarian Revolution", and he hopes that his political
ideas
will spread throughout the continent.
>
>This in itself would be alarming enough to the United States, had it
>the time to pay proper attention. Equally worrying for the Americans
is
>the time Chávez has devoted to the Middle East, successfully courting
>the governments that belong to Opec, the oil producers' organisation,
>some of whom have been labelled by the Americans as "the axis of
evil".
>Today's high oil price has much to do with increased demand from China
>and India, and from the Iraq war, but the spadework that has given
Opec
>fresh credibility was put in by Chávez. Soon he will be helping to
show
>the new Iranian president, using the Venezuelan example, how to
>increase the revenues of a state-owned oil company and channel them
>into programmes to help the poor.
>
>Chávez is widely popular today, but for much of his presidency he has
>been a contested, even a hated figure, arousing widespread discontent
>within Venezuela's traditional white elite. Yet although his rhetoric
>is revolutionary, his reforms have been moderate and social
democratic.
>He criticises the policies of "savage neo-liberalism" that have done
so
>much harm to the poorer peoples of Venezuela and Latin America in the
>past 20 years, yet the private sector is still alive and well. His
land
>reform is aimed chiefly at unproductive land and provides for
>compensation. His most obvious achievement, which should not have been
>controversial, has been to channel increased oil revenues into a fresh
>range of social projects that bring health and education into
neglected
shanty-towns.
>The hatred that he arouses in the old opposition parties, which have
>seen their membership and influence dwindle, lies more in ideology and
>racial antipathy than in material loss. Some opponents dislike his
>friendship with Castro, his verbal hostility to the United States, and
>his criticisms of the Catholic church, and some people still have a
>residual hostility to the fact that he staged an unsuccessful military
>coup in 1992 when a young colonel in the parachute regiment. Many
Latin
>Americans still find it difficult to come to terms with the idea of a
>progressive military man. But mostly they are alarmed by the way in
>which he has enfranchised the country\'s vast underclass, interrupting
>the cosy, US-influenced lifestyle of the white middle class with
>visions of a frightening world that lives beyond their apartheid-gated
communities.
>
>Over the past few years this anxious opposition has made several
>attempts to get rid of Chávez, with the tacit encouragement of
>Washington. They organised a coup in April 2002 that rebounded against
>them two days later when the kidnapped Chávez was returned to power by
>an alliance of the army and the people. They tried an economic coup by
>closing down the oil refineries, and this too was a failure. Last
>year\'s recall-referendum, designed to lead to a defeat for Chávez,
was
>an overwhelming victory for him. The local opposition, and by
extension
>the United States, have shot their final bolt. There is nothing left
in
>the locker, except of course assassination.
>
>The fingers of mad preachers are usually far from the button, but the
>untimely words of Pat Robertson, easily discounted in Washington and
>airily dismissed by the state department as "inappropriate", might yet
>wake an echo among zealots in Venezuela. A similar call was made last
>year by a former Venezuelan president. Assassinations may be easy to
>plan, and not difficult to accomplish. But their legacy is
>incalculable. The radical leader of neighbouring Colombia, Jorge
>Gaitán, was assassinated more than 50 years ago, in 1948. In terms of
>civil war and violence, the Colombians have been paying the price ever
>since. No one would wish that fate on Venezuela.
>",1]);//-->
>The hatred that he arouses in the old opposition parties, which have
>seen their membership and influence dwindle, lies more in ideology and
>racial antipathy than in material loss. Some opponents dislike his
>friendship with Castro, his verbal hostility to the United States, and
>his criticisms of the Catholic church, and some people still have a
>residual hostility to the fact that he staged an unsuccessful military
>coup in 1992 when a young colonel in the parachute regiment. Many
Latin
>Americans still find it difficult to come to terms with the idea of a
>progressive military man. But mostly they are alarmed by the way in
>which he has enfranchised the country's vast underclass, interrupting
>the cosy, US-influenced lifestyle of the white middle class with
>visions of a frightening world that lives beyond their apartheid-gated
communities.
>
>Over the past few years this anxious opposition has made several
>attempts to get rid of Chávez, with the tacit encouragement of
>Washington. They organised a coup in April 2002 that rebounded against
>them two days later when the kidnapped Chávez was returned to power by
>an alliance of the army and the people. They tried an economic coup by
>closing down the oil refineries, and this too was a failure. Last
>year's recall-referendum, designed to lead to a defeat for Chávez, was
>an overwhelming victory for him. The local opposition, and by
extension
>the United States, have shot their final bolt. There is nothing left
in
>the locker, except of course assassination.
>
>The fingers of mad preachers are usually far from the button, but the
>untimely words of Pat Robertson, easily discounted in Washington and
>airily dismissed by the state department as "inappropriate", might yet
>wake an echo among zealots in Venezuela. A similar call was made last
>year by a former Venezuelan president. Assassinations may be easy to
>plan, and not difficult to accomplish. But their legacy is
>incalculable. The radical leader of neighbouring Colombia, Jorge
>Gaitán, was assassinated more than 50 years ago, in 1948. In terms of
>civil war and violence, the Colombians have been paying the price ever
>since. No one would wish that fate on Venezuela.
>· Richard Gott is the author of Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian
>Revolution, published this month by Verso, price £9.99.
>
>Copyright Guardian Newspapers Limited
>