Before the "big storm" (the Russian original was posted on March 21)
I'm asked to comment on the fresh post by Zhuchkovsky about the situation.
I had been to Moscow for three days, and in that period the situation in Novorossia escalated still some more. There are significant events everyday, and it feels like the lull before the "big storm". Upon returning I learned many interesting things (although I can tell only a few of them), to outline the priorities for the near future, so to speak.
1. From March 10 to 13 Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu was in the Rostov region and held closed meetings to discuss, so to say, the "current security situation of Russia and adjacent territories." Meanwhile, "preparatory work" continues on the border, it seems like we would have all we need to repel any threat from the ground and from the air even in case of a steep turn in the situation. The Center also takes control of important sectors of the front, where there is an active enemy activity and offensive plans are predictable.
2. The boundary runs in the same harsh regime, and security forces are taking control of the few left "gaps". Just after my arrival I faced a significantly ridiculous situation. One militiaman who has long arrived from Germany to fight in the DPR decided to return, but he was not allowed across the border, because his visa expired. We had to "evacuate" him on our own.
3. Apparently, the Center aims the maximum cutting of the uncontrolled aid for militia - both humanitarian and "non-humanitarian". Another example. We recently delivered drones to one of the most important sectors of the front, they showed excellent results - large concentrations of enemy armored vehicles were discovered, previously unknown to Staff. The Command was alarmed that such valuable information is found out using the "third force" and they even tried to "nick" our devices. Attempt failed, but in the end, thank God, they wisely agreed to act together. In this example I want to show that the "crackdown" on the border fronts and are not dictated by malignant intent (the notorious "surrender"), but by the desire of "vacationers" to control the territory as much as before the upcoming events. Though of course I do not like it very much. Someone wrote that I have approved closing the border because it is necessary for "PX". I have not approved, I was misunderstood, I was just trying to explain the situation logically. But humanitarian disaster reigns in Donbass, so the desire of the Center to control the situation (combating smuggling of weapons to the Russian Federation, the gangs in the republics, theft of goods, trade of humanitarian aid and so on.) still does not justify the "cutting" of non-governmental aid flows from Russia.
4. Kononov gave DPR defense ministerial position to his deputy secretary Velikorodny, well-known in Donbass as "Cap". He was our commander in Semyonovka in May-July, we continued to work in Snezhnoye under his leadership after his departure from Slavyansk. He also received large loads for distribution in the Semyonovka Battalion (which was not only deployed in Snezhnoye). Today, I asked "Cap" whether to congratulate, but he said it is not necessary, he is still just "acting" and Kononov may return after solving personal issues. By the experience of similar "temporary resignations" I doubt that he would return, but "Cap" may also not be adopted, especially because he is from Moscow, and there are locals who are usually appointed to high posts.
5. We have resumed work with the underground groups in the occupied territories and have conducted some preliminary "consultations". The second priority for the next month and a half is the collection of new drones. In view of the upcoming fighting, we need additional "eyes" for better intelligence and security in case of disabling the first devices. The third issue is the purchase of uniform and shoes for militia. Winter clothing is already worn out, and the usual one has long got out of order.
https://www.facebook.com/juchkovsky/posts/859645450740988 (in Russian) - link
P.S. The points.
1. I can add that a visit of Commander of the Air Force to Rostov Region is expected today or tomorrow.
2. Indeed, the control continues to tighten on the border, just food can be basically taken after an agreement. Well, the smugglers began to be caught.
3. Again, it is so. On the one hand centralization is clear, but on the other hand bureaucratic delays influence the delivery of purely humanitarian goods.
4. I wrote about this fact yesterday, I also doubt that Kononov would return. Plus rumors revived again that Bezler is to return to Novorossia, who has been suggested for the position of DPR defense minister last fall.
5. It is true about uniform and drones - this is what is necessary for front-line units in the near future. I could look at it with an example of Shirokino battalion commander fighting in boots and tatter.
http://voicesevas.ru/news/11210-hronika-voennyh-sobytiy-v-novorossii-za-21032015.html - the online-broadcast on the "Voice of Sevastopol" for March 21
http://cassad.net/category/war/1443-svodka-voennyh-sobytiy-v-novorossii-za-20032015.html - the summary of military events in Novorossia for March 20
http://cassad.net/tv/videos/6366/ - a review of the military map for March 19
http://cassad.net/tv/videos/6364/ - a video-summary from "Cassad-TV" for March 19-20
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2099740.html (in Russian)
The bulk of this translation was copied from the following translation posted on the English "Voice of Sevastopol":
http://en.voicesevas.ru/news/analytics/3679-before-the-big-storm.html