A brief but important update.
1. Riots in Konstantinovka, due to their spontaneous nature, didn't lead to anything more significant than blowing off the hatred towards the occupiers that was accumulating for a long time. Konstantinovka is not only a town in the rear, so no significant military support from the DPR could be expected (at best, several SRG could seep in there), but the epicenter of the unrest was located in the area full of the junta forces. The Artyomovsk group was located nearby plus there were the reserves that cover Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. So without outside help the unrest couldn't lead to the deposition of the junta power in Konstantinovka and to the spreading of the process to the neighboring cities. After the steam was blown off, the punitive troops proceeded to suppress the protests. The Right Sector militants and highly motivated military forces were brought into the city, after which the sweep and arrests followed. Without having sufficient amount of weapons and ammunition, a spontaneous riot was doomed. Nevertheless, these protests showed that the occupation regime is based on naked violence and if the junta will suffer a military defeat then our soldiers will be met as liberators in the settlements where the junta regime will be removed.
2. There are still difficulties with cargo passage on the border. Medicines are still not allowed, there are issues with technical cargo. Humanitarian cargo with food is allowed to pass by agreement. The process of gradual re-subordination of the humanitarian flows to the EMERCOM continues. Plus there is also a block for commercial cargo, which were earlier pulled through the humanitarian channels as if it was humanitarian cargo. Correspondingly, the humanitarian flows will gradually get out of the grey zone and will either become completely legal and use permits or they will become fully illegal. Naturally, these transformations made the process of shipping cargo more difficult, although one cannot say that there is a complete blockade there. We will send new cargo with food and uniforms over the next few days. It will be clear how much the EMERCOM will tighten the bolts in the coming 1-2 weeks.
3. Since the start of the year about 800-900 people have been detained in the DPR for various cases associated with crime, expropriations, murder, burglaries, and so forth. The work on removing criminal element is quite systematic. Several hundred guns in illegal circulation have been captured, although by various estimates there may be up to 30-35 thousand of unregistered guns that are stored illegally on the territory of the DPR.
4. Low-intensity shelling and firefights continued at the front today. Just like before, there are clashes at Shirokino and near Donetsk. The enemy uses artillery. The DPR authorities regularly accuse the junta of violating every possible point of the "truce". The junta simply ignores these accusations and continues to accumulate forces, preparing for the next stage of the war. The largest groups are deployed at Mariupol, Volnovakha, Donetsk, Artyomovsk, Bakhmutka, and Schastye. The groups at Volnovakha and Donetsk have offensive configuration. The artillery pullback on the junta side still has a fictitious nature.
5. The military have conflicting data on the terms of the junta offensive. Some say that war will start in April, others say that it may erupt in the coming few days unless the junta stops its provocations. Nobody believes that there will be a peaceful ending to this. Cars are not allowed to drive to the frontline, for now our humanitarian specialists managed to get there using armor. In the fields north of Logvinovo there are still scattered tanks, IFVs, trucks; most of this was hit by the NAF artillery. They also managed to learn about our materiel losses at Logvinovo: two IFV were lost (one vehicle of the GRU Spetsnaz vehicles was burned and another one of the army people) and also one tank was damaged.
6. Pavel Dryomov is doing fine overall now, his units are supplied by the Ministry of Defense of the LPR. His old conflict with the LPR leadership has disappeared from public sphere now.
Simultaneously the backstage talks on dividing power in the republic between Plotnitsky and Kozitsyn continue so that Cossacks can finally integrate into the system of power in the LPR.
7. There is still a quite serious lack of qualified tank crewmen in the DPR army. They are eagerly waiting for Russian volunteers with tank crewmen skills, as well as those who can teach people to operate tanks. Phone numbers of the camps for training volunteers and the Republican recruitment offices can be found fairly easily.
http://cassad.net/tv/videos/6240/ (in Russian) - a video-summary from "Cassad-TV" for March 15-16
http://cassad.net/tv/videos/6241/ (in Russian) - a map of military action from "Cassad-TV" for March 16
http://voicesevas.ru/news/11062-hronika-voennyh-sobytiy-v-novorossii-za-17032015.html (in Russian) - the online-broadcast of military action on the "Voice of Sevastopol" for 03/17
http://cassad.net/tv/videos/6195/ (in Russian) - the video about the GRU Spetsnaz in Logvinovo
Original article:
http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2094741.html (in Russian)
Yandex translation of the comments posted to the original Russian blog entry:
https://translate.yandex.com/translate?url=http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2094741.html%23comments&lang=ru-en