A brief but important update
While the media hustle associated with "Putin's disappearance" continues and the rumors of various coup scenarios multiply, I will write briefly about the important developments in Novorossia.
1. The flows of non-government humanitarian cargo have effectively stopped on the border, perhaps only the food is still passing through, everything else is stuck for now. There are some organizational measures associated with the centralization of the flows locked onto the Russian EMERCOM. Nevertheless, there is no control over the border from the side of the OSCE and the junta; the voentorg operates in its regular mode.
2. There is a sequence of arrests in the DPR (which include the representatives of the authorities). The main reasons are participation/cooperation with various organized crime groups, schemes of smuggling weapons and "expropriated" property to the territory of the RF, refusal to fight, etc. They don't look much at prior achievements - the goal is to remove people with criminal background and it is pursued relentlessly. The fight against the enemy agents is also intensified. The main role is played by the Ministry for State Security and the military counter-intelligence.
3. The "truce" is pretty much not observed. Lately I talked to a person who left the front at Donetsk a couple of days ago for a business trip - he told me that the positions of their brigade were hammered from howitzers and MLRS. Our forces similarly hit the enemy positions. In the end there is a media rupture of sorts: in the media the situation is muffled or ignored. They continue to dream up the "truce". In practice there is low-intensity military action at various locations, where both sides periodically suffer minor losses.
4. About the offensive and the time when it starts: in principle our forces are fully ready if the junta decides to go in. It is not advantageous for our forces to start first, because then there will be an onslaught of accusations of a direct aggression. So, just like in winter, they simply wait while the junta makes a move, after which there will be a rough response. The stuff that was pulled back as a part of diplomatic maneuvering will return to its positions (in case it becomes necessary) within 3-4 hours on average. Serious accumulation of the junta forces and the very same cheating associated with fictitious pullback of artillery is still noted behind the front line. Regardless of the terms of the start of the war, the army will grow due to the final reformatting of the old and the already acting units and also due to forming new units from mobilization and volunteers. Naturally, due to the prevailing theme of war, which may start in the short term, the nation-building continues to proceed at turtle pace.
5. The enemy is wary of a strike from Popasnaya and Stakhanov towards Artyomovsk, which may cut the whole front in Donbass and split the AFU group on the occupied territories of the DPR from the forces concentrated on the LPR territory. According to the orders from the ATO headquarters and the sector command, at least 2 mechanized brigades must be deployed in the area of Artyomovsk, which should cover Artyomovsk and Slavyansk-Kramatorsk area. Holding on to Dolomitnoye and Troitskoye is also considered by the enemy to be highly significant, because preserving the current configuration of the Svetlodarsk wedge allows them to avoid the risk of a new encirclement and to avoid the necessity of splitting the Artyomovsk group again.
6. Regarding the continuing fighting at Shirokino: according to the unconfirmed information (I cannot confirm this at 100%, so I report it as it is), the continuation of the military action in the area of Mariupol is a personal initiative by Turchinov et al., who try to guarantee the disruption of the Minsk agreements as a part of the long since deceased "Turchinov's offensive". The "Azov" punitive regiment serves as a mundane instrument for fraying a cease-fire and for organizing various provocations. The civilian sentiment in Mariupol itself is currently fairly beneficial for us: the junta supporters are in a significant minority there. Nevertheless, a head-on assault on Mariupol is unlikely.
7. Regarding the shipments of foreign lightly armored vehicles. The majority of these vehicles will go towards arming territorial and punitive battalions and also towards reinforcing significantly battered units where there is a critical lack of armor (due to losses and mechanical failures), which must be fixed as soon as possible. The military value of these vehicles is evaluated as being not very high even by the Ukrainian command, but they are not in a position to choose because the tempos of replenishing their losses clearly lag behind their needs.
Original article: http://colonelcassad.livejournal.com/2090362.html (in Russian)
Yandex translation of the comments posted to the original Russian blog entry:
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