Готтфрид Лейбниц о проблеме мозг-разум

Jul 03, 2020 10:49

Меня недавно спросили, почему сознание неалгоритмизуемо. Часть ответа вынесу в отдельную запись.

В научном сообществе сегодня преобладают взгляды Эпикура. Однако это не всегда было так. Были крупные учёные противники материализма. И, о чудо, это им не мешало делать науку. И дураками их назвать тоже, надеюсь, язык не повернётся.

Мне попадалась цитата Лейбница о немеханистичности сознания и внутренних переживаний (несводимости сознания к природным закономерностям).



Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)

One is obliged to admit that perception and what depends upon it is inexplicable on mechanical principles, that is, by figures and motions. In imagining that there is a machine whose construction would enable it to think, to sense, and to have perception, one could conceive it enlarged while retaining the same proportions, so that one could enter into it, just like into a windmill. Supposing this, one should, when visiting within it, find only parts pushing one another, and never anything by which to explain a perception. Thus it is in the simple substance, and not in the composite or in the machine, that one must look for perception.

Monadology (1714)

И еще интересные цитаты из Лейбница:

Furthermore, by means of the soul or form, there is a true unity which corresponds to what is called the I in us; such a thing could not occur in artificial machines, nor in the simple mass of matter, however organized it may be.

New System of Nature (1695)

But in addition to the general principles which establish the monads of which compound things are merely the results, internal experience refutes the Epicurean [i.e. materialist] doctrine. This experience is the consciousness which is in us of this I which apperceives things which occur in the body. This perception cannot be explained by figures and movements.

Reply to Bayle (1702)

Вот здесь приведен контекст:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/

вычисление, mind/body problem, цитата

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