Upright Biped отвечает в защиту биосемиотического аргумента в пользу дизайна биосферы
Замечательный комментарий.
Я всего-навсего изложил хорошо задокументированную историю развития мысли по данному вопросу. Ч. Пирс продемонстрировал, что для указания на одну из возможных альтернатив, требуется знак, референт и отдельный интерпретант, устанавливающий физическое соответствие между знаком и референтом. Пирсова модель, кстати, занимает центральное место в научной картине мира любого материалиста. В 1936 г. А. Тьюринг сконструировал вычислительную машину, в основе организации вычислительного процесса которой лежала именно тройка Пирса. Затем Дж. Нейман с использованием математической модели вычислителя, называемой машиной Тьюринга, сформулировал ряд требований для построения автономного самовоспроизводящегося автомата. Корректность требований, выведенных Дж. Нейманом, была полностью подтверждена Ф. Криком, открывшим генетический код с рамкой считывания. Дж. Нейман [или Ф. Крик, из цитаты не совсем ясно -- mns2012] также предсказал о существовании в системе размножения организмов тех ограничений, о которых говорил Ч. Пирс. Эти физические ограничения были впоследствии выявлены М. Хоагландом и П. Замекником. В то же самое время группа М. Найренберга установила конкретные нуклеотидно-аминокислотные соответствия, задаваемые этими ограничениями. Всё это уже давно подробно описано в специализированной литературе как единственный известный науке пример (помимо естественных языков) последовательного многозначного языка, встречающегося в природе. Нужно упомянуть и то, что для обеспечения длительного автономного самовоспроизведения (так наз. персистентности) к системе размножения добавляется организационное требование семантической замкнутости. Может быть, Вам стоит спросить себя, почему Вы подходите к перечислению этих фактов истории науки как к атаке на "эволюционную теорию".
Antonin at no.453
What I suspect you are objecting to is the evolvability of the current process from simpler precursors.
I simply laid out a well-recorded history of thought on the subject. Pierce modeled the physical capacity to specify something among alternatives; requiring a representation, a referent, and a separate interpretant to establish what was being represented. This model is dead center of any materialist view of the physical cosmos. Turing built that same triadic relationship into his 1936 machine - indeed; it was the entire mechanism behind the machine’s ability to function. Von Neumann then used that machine to successfully predict the material requirements of an autonomous self-replicator. His predictions were wholly confirmed by Crick’s discovery of a reading frame code in DNA and his further prediction that a set of Piercean constraints would be found at work in the system. These were later isolated by Hoagland and Zamecnik, while Nirenberg et al went on to list the individual associations established by the constraints. And all of this has since been carefully and meticulously described in the physics literature as the only other example of a general purpose (sequential, multi-referent) language (other than human language) found anywhere in the cosmos. This also includes the additional organizational requirement of being semantically closed in order to function (i.e. to persist over time). You might ask yourself why you viewed the listing of these historical facts as an attack on “evolutionary theory”.
We can only surmise what the biochemistry was like in the earliest organisms that could both grow and replicate.
Well, okay. I imagine we can do a bit more than that. We can follow established scientific reasoning and infer that the forces and substances in nature acted (back then) just as they do today. Likewise, we can infer that any theory that requires those forces and substances to act differently (back then) than they do today (accomplishing effects they’ve never been known or recorded to accomplish) are less grounded in evidence and reason than theories that do not require such things - in particular, theories that expect nature to have acted (back then) exactly as it does today, and proposes causes that are known (and well-documented) to be adequate to explain the phenomena.
My question to you is ‘what is it’ empirically-speaking that motivates the idea that the gene system isn’t exactly what it was predicted to be (a semantically-closed, sequential, multi-referent symbol system, using a medium of information established by a set of physical constraints) confirmed by experiment and fully described by physics?
Alternatively, we can certainly assume that some form of biologically-relevant constituents came together at a common place on earth. We can further assume that these constituents all came together in the necessary quantities in some form of conducive environment. We can then assume that some unknown sequential dynamic replicator formed in that environment.
We can further assume that while this dynamic replicator replicated, it also dynamically produced some form of discrete product that could serve as a constraint to establish a first unique informational relationship. We can further assume that while this sequence kept on replicating it produced a second discrete product to serve as a constraint. We can then assume, one by one, more discrete products were produced by the dynamics of this unknown sequence. We can go on to assume that along its length, it continued replicating dynamically as it produced all the constraints necessary to describe itself in a symbol system, along with all the additional products that would cause it to bring its symbols and constraints together in a hierarchy capable of transitioning from a dynamic replicator to a symbolic replicator. Or we can shuffle all those things around and come up with a whole new set of assumptions. Likewise, we can simply ignore the logic that any organization which must maintain its function as it transitions from one system of description to another must (at some point in that transition) function in both systems. We can also ignore how many constraints are required to synthesize a constraint from memory. And we can certainly ignore the simultaneous organization required for semantic closure to occur.
Is this the bottom line for you? Do you believe that, given the documented physical evidence (with its genuine history of prediction and discovery), there is simply no room for dispute about the validity of materialists’ assumptions - that is, there is no intellectual or scientifically-respectable dissent from materialism? Is this not where you are at? Or, or do you have a positioning statement to retain the line in practice while seeming otherwise?
Я всего-навсего изложил хорошо задокументированную историю развития мысли по данному вопросу. Ч. Пирс продемонстрировал, что для указания на одну из возможных альтернатив, требуется знак, референт и отдельный интерпретант, устанавливающий физическое соответствие между знаком и референтом. Пирсова модель, кстати, занимает центральное место в научной картине мира любого материалиста. В 1936 г. А. Тьюринг сконструировал вычислительную машину, в основе организации вычислительного процесса которой лежала именно тройка Пирса. Затем Дж. Нейман с использованием математической модели вычислителя, называемой машиной Тьюринга, сформулировал ряд требований для построения автономного самовоспроизводящегося автомата. Корректность требований, выведенных Дж. Нейманом, была полностью подтверждена Ф. Криком, открывшим генетический код с рамкой считывания. Дж. Нейман [или Ф. Крик, из цитаты не совсем ясно -- mns2012] также предсказал о существовании в системе размножения организмов тех ограничений, о которых говорил Ч. Пирс. Эти физические ограничения были впоследствии выявлены М. Хоагландом и П. Замекником. В то же самое время группа М. Найренберга установила конкретные нуклеотидно-аминокислотные соответствия, задаваемые этими ограничениями. Всё это уже давно подробно описано в специализированной литературе как единственный известный науке пример (помимо естественных языков) последовательного многозначного языка, встречающегося в природе. Нужно упомянуть и то, что для обеспечения длительного автономного самовоспроизведения (так наз. персистентности) к системе размножения добавляется организационное требование семантической замкнутости. Может быть, Вам стоит спросить себя, почему Вы подходите к перечислению этих фактов истории науки как к атаке на "эволюционную теорию".
Antonin at no.453
What I suspect you are objecting to is the evolvability of the current process from simpler precursors.
I simply laid out a well-recorded history of thought on the subject. Pierce modeled the physical capacity to specify something among alternatives; requiring a representation, a referent, and a separate interpretant to establish what was being represented. This model is dead center of any materialist view of the physical cosmos. Turing built that same triadic relationship into his 1936 machine - indeed; it was the entire mechanism behind the machine’s ability to function. Von Neumann then used that machine to successfully predict the material requirements of an autonomous self-replicator. His predictions were wholly confirmed by Crick’s discovery of a reading frame code in DNA and his further prediction that a set of Piercean constraints would be found at work in the system. These were later isolated by Hoagland and Zamecnik, while Nirenberg et al went on to list the individual associations established by the constraints. And all of this has since been carefully and meticulously described in the physics literature as the only other example of a general purpose (sequential, multi-referent) language (other than human language) found anywhere in the cosmos. This also includes the additional organizational requirement of being semantically closed in order to function (i.e. to persist over time). You might ask yourself why you viewed the listing of these historical facts as an attack on “evolutionary theory”.
We can only surmise what the biochemistry was like in the earliest organisms that could both grow and replicate.
Well, okay. I imagine we can do a bit more than that. We can follow established scientific reasoning and infer that the forces and substances in nature acted (back then) just as they do today. Likewise, we can infer that any theory that requires those forces and substances to act differently (back then) than they do today (accomplishing effects they’ve never been known or recorded to accomplish) are less grounded in evidence and reason than theories that do not require such things - in particular, theories that expect nature to have acted (back then) exactly as it does today, and proposes causes that are known (and well-documented) to be adequate to explain the phenomena.
My question to you is ‘what is it’ empirically-speaking that motivates the idea that the gene system isn’t exactly what it was predicted to be (a semantically-closed, sequential, multi-referent symbol system, using a medium of information established by a set of physical constraints) confirmed by experiment and fully described by physics?
Alternatively, we can certainly assume that some form of biologically-relevant constituents came together at a common place on earth. We can further assume that these constituents all came together in the necessary quantities in some form of conducive environment. We can then assume that some unknown sequential dynamic replicator formed in that environment.
We can further assume that while this dynamic replicator replicated, it also dynamically produced some form of discrete product that could serve as a constraint to establish a first unique informational relationship. We can further assume that while this sequence kept on replicating it produced a second discrete product to serve as a constraint. We can then assume, one by one, more discrete products were produced by the dynamics of this unknown sequence. We can go on to assume that along its length, it continued replicating dynamically as it produced all the constraints necessary to describe itself in a symbol system, along with all the additional products that would cause it to bring its symbols and constraints together in a hierarchy capable of transitioning from a dynamic replicator to a symbolic replicator. Or we can shuffle all those things around and come up with a whole new set of assumptions. Likewise, we can simply ignore the logic that any organization which must maintain its function as it transitions from one system of description to another must (at some point in that transition) function in both systems. We can also ignore how many constraints are required to synthesize a constraint from memory. And we can certainly ignore the simultaneous organization required for semantic closure to occur.
Is this the bottom line for you? Do you believe that, given the documented physical evidence (with its genuine history of prediction and discovery), there is simply no room for dispute about the validity of materialists’ assumptions - that is, there is no intellectual or scientifically-respectable dissent from materialism? Is this not where you are at? Or, or do you have a positioning statement to retain the line in practice while seeming otherwise?