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Mar 29, 2006 16:08

Joseph Beaton
FAHS 0142-02
Imaging and Possessing the Americas
Eulogio Guzman

“How was it that a motley bunch of Spanish adventurers, never numbering much more than four hundred or so, was able to defeat an Amerindian military power on its home ground in the space of two years?” (Clendinnen, 12). Many factors contributed to the Spanish victory in the New World, including the strategic prowess of the European commanders, convenient mishaps on behalf of the natives, and sheer luck coupled with nature. While Clendinnen is referring specifically to Cortes’s interaction with the Aztecs, Pizarro’s conquest of the Inka Empire mirrors that of Cortes in many ways.
First, we examine Hernan Cortes’ conquest of the Aztec empire under the rule of Motecuhzoma. Shortly after his unauthorized departure from Cuba, Cortes encountered two native speakers, one being his future mistress Dona Marina. This significant union placed the Europeans in excellent position to face the indigenous population of Mexico. Upon their first encounter with agents sent from Motecuhzoma, the Spaniards were given lavish gifts of gold and precious jewels, as was Aztec custom. Motecuhzoma believed he was performing a ritual of dominance; by accepting the gifts, the adventurers were acknowledging their inferiority. However, this act proves fateful for the Aztecs, as the sight of gold would awaken the European appetite for conquest. In Duran’s Historia, he entertains the possibility that Motecuhzoma had feared that the visitors were an Aztec deity named Quetzalcoatl, and therefore had the gifts sent to them as tribute, however this theory has not been proven (Duran, 497-498). Regardless of Motecuhzoma’s intentions, the possibility nicely illustrates one of the many advantages the Spanish benefited from - the repeated Aztec misconception that the Conquistadors were of divine origin. This could also explain why Motecuhzoma allowed the invaders to waltz right into the capital city, as Williamson elaborates:
“It remains unclear what [Motecuhzoma’s] real intentions could have been in allowing the Spaniards to advance so far into the heart of his realms. Speculation focuses on the apparent weakness of his character and on his alleged belief that Cortes was the god Quetzalcoatl come to reclaim his kingdom, but these suppositions must be treated with caution… it is far more likely Motecuhzoma simply misread Cortes, amongst other reasons because the ends of war and politics in Middle America were quite different from those of Renaissance Europe” (Williamson, 18).
Those differences in war and politics mentioned by Williamson add to the advantage of the Europeans. For instance, regarding the nature of battle, the Aztec goal was to capture enemies for later sacrifice, whereas the Spanish aimed to kill and conquer. The armaments of each force again highlight this contrast; the Aztec were mostly unclad and armed with wooden shields and wooden swords, lined with sharp obsidian, while the conquistadors fought with steel swords and shields, and many wore metal armor. These factors contribute to an overwhelming Spanish advantage on the battlefield, hindered only by the sheer numbers of the Aztec military (Lockhart, 32). This is evidenced on “Noche Triste”, the night when the Cortes attempted to escape Tenochtitlan, losing most of his forces due to the cramped fighting conditions and swarms of indigenous fighters.
Previous to his entrance into Tenochtitlan, Cortes was also able to capitalize on the fractured loyalty of the indigenous to Motecuhzoma, particularly the people of Tlaxcala. These alliances boosted the number of invading forces from a few hundred to a few thousand. However, Cortes’s first attempt at conquest was not a frontal assault, but rather to initiate a coup de’tat from inside the city by holding Motecuhzoma hostage. This failed miserably when Cortes was called away from the city by advancing Spanish forces ordered to arrest him for acting without authority. The pressure grew on the men he left in the city until battle broke out, and upon Cortes’ return and retreat from Tenochtitlan, he knew the only way to take the city was to assault it head on.
While much of the Spanish victory can be attributed to Cortes’ strategizing, such as the formation of alliances, the attempted coup, and the final siege and razing of Tenochtitlan, many events occurred out of the realm of the Conquistador’s power, like the encounter with Dona Marina, the inferiority of Aztec technology, and the devastation caused by the smallpox virus (of which Cortes couldn’t have been aware).
The story of Francisco Pizzaro and the conquest of the Inka Empire in Peru is similar to that of Cortes in many ways. After the fall of the Aztecs, the Europeans were largely obsessed with finding the next Mexico. Spanish expeditions to Nicaragua and further north were unsuccessful, and two veterans of the Indies, Pizarro and Diego de Almagro obtained permission to search for a rumored kingdom of gold called Biru or Peru (Williamson, 22). Upon the discovery of the Inkan city of Tumbes, and the evidence of gold, Pizarro obtained permission the conquer Peru, however inciting distaste with Almagro as Pizarro was to receive the greater honor of Governor of Peru. This conflict would eventually erupt into open battle. The Europeans were very fortunate to encounter an Inkan empire in the midst of civil war, caused by the death of its emperor from smallpox, which had spread from Mexico to the north. It was also a lucky coincidence that Atahuallpa, the favored Inka to take the throne, was located in the abandoned city of Cajamarca, close to Tumbes where Pizarro and his men were camped. It also benefited the Spaniards that the Inkan emperor’s position was seen as divine; therefore when they captured him at Cajamarca, Pizarro had effectively taken control of the entire empire. Similarly as with Cortes, the natives had known of the European presence previous to this encounter:
“As had occurred in Mexico, the Indians kept the Spaniards under surveillance as they made their way to Cajamarca, but, again for reasons which are not clear, the native emperor forbore to destroy an invasion force numbering a mere 60 horsemen and some 100 foot-soldiers”(Williamson, 24).
Like Motecuhzoma, Atahaullpa also misjudged Pizarro and his intentions¬ while he was held captive:
“He thought it scarcely possible that they would actually want to rule his empire; more likely they were bandits who could be bought off with gold and later destroyed… he therefore ordered his generals not to attack the Spaniards, and instead offered them a huge ransom in pure gold” (Williamson, 25).
When Pizarro learned of one of Atahuallpa’s armies possibly marching against him, he had the emperor murdered, causing dissatisfaction with the Spanish crown (they were, after all, on a mission from God), but also causing the Spanish to ally with Atahuallpa’s Inkan enemies, the forces of his half brother Huascar. Pizarro could now use this alliance to his advantage, and quickly instated Huascar’s brother Tupac as a puppet emperor, appearing as restorer’s of the true Inkan line. Tupac eventually died, possibly murdered by another Inkan, and Pizarro was forced to face the royal armies on the open battlefield, where he enjoyed the technological benefits that helped Cortes in Mexico. “Many Indians had their hands cut off but continued to support their ruler…their efforts were of little avail, for they were all killed… we continued in this way for a long while, overpoweringn and killing the Indians”(Hemming, 109). After much bloodshed, Pizarro had definite control of the empire, and was styling himself “Governor of Peru”. Manco Huallpa, brother of Tupac, had succeeded the throne after Tupacs death. After spending much time in alliance with Pizarro, still believing in his good nature, he finally awoke to the true intentions of the Spanish, and retreated to the wilderness to incite a native uprising. He laid siege to the coastal Pizarran capital of Lima, but was eventually defeated when Spanish reinforces forced him to retreat.
Many of the events in the conquest of Peru helped the Spanish in a way that was not shared by Cortes in Mexico, such as the existing civil war, however it was Pizarro’s ingenuity that was able to take advantage of the situation by playing one side against the other until it was easy for him to take full control. While there may not have been the existence of a Dona Marina to aide Pizarro, he still benefited from the Inka failing to act when the European force was vulnerable, as in the case of the Aztec. Both forces also had a huge advantage in terms of warfare technology, such that even a small band of men could handle overwhelming inferior native forces. Such an asset cannot be attributed to any one man or force, as it pertains to the development of civilizations. It can only be said that these two peoples were completely alien to one another, and while the indigenous Americans were curious and unsure of their visitors, the Spanish invaders came with a purpose, and would not be swayed from their course of action.

WORKS CITED

- Clendinnen, Inga “Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty”, in New World Encounters, ed. Stephen Greenblatt, pp. 12-47. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1993
- Duran, Diego “Chs. 63, and 67-70” in the History of the Indies of New Spain, trans. Doris Heyden. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1994
- Franklin, Stuart “Pizarro Conqueror of the Inca” in National Geographic, February 1992: 90 - 121
- Lockhart, James and Stuart B. Schwartz, “Indigenous Ways”, in Early Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983; 31-57
- Williamson, Edwin “The Conquest of Peru”, in The Penguin History of Latin America. London: Penguin Books. 1992; 22-36

- Gibaldi, Joseph MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers: Sixth Edition, The Modern Language Association of America, New York. 2003
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