(no subject)
Chong-sik Lee, Counterinsurgency in Manchuria: the Japanese Experience, 1931-1940 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1967).
The publisher & timing of this book should make it obvious why it was commissioned; it's half 'history,' half translated documents (the history portion is sort of a summation of the documents, so it does whack you over the head a bit). However, it was clearly not designed to be some hard hitting work of new theory - I've read a couple of Lee's articles on Sino-Korean collaboration, and he's quite a capable writer.
A few things to take away from this: most counterinsurgency measures are not going to be successful unless there is 'traditional' military conflict first, and the Japanese experience was no different. Lee lists five counterinsurgency measures, and only the first is distinctly militaristic (paramilitary operations). The rest (separating insurgents from the masses, 'purification' and reform of towns and villages, reconstruction of towns, propaganda and pacification measures) are targeted not at insurgents, but the base necessary for insurgents to exist.
Much attention is paid to the Japanese method of moving people to 'collective hamlets.' These served as defensive units and as a way to cut off the insurgents from food supplies and supporters (probably the most important aspect in fighting insurgents); unfortunately, since defense & the counterinsurgency campaigns were the primary targets, the life of a number of farmers did worsen in overcrowded conditions (in short, not enough attention was paid to the variety of conditions that existed in Manchuria, heavily depended on geography and terrain). Still, there were some 'progressive' measures taken; reading the primary documents, it does seem that a number of Japanese had a firm grasp on the necessity of keeping people happy (even if it wasn't always so successful). I hesitate to say that they took a 'light touch' with the (non-insurgent) masses, but there is certainly an element of 'making ourselves more attractive than the opposition by providing real and concrete improvements to daily life' here.
Apparently by '40, the insurgency was more or less crushed. I'm not clear on what other elements were involved (bandits and secret society groups are mentioned very briefly) - the bulk of attention is paid to Communist elements, Chinese Communists at that (Lee mentions the Minshengtuan incident which really wreaked havoc on collaboration between Chinese & Korean CP members).
The publisher & timing of this book should make it obvious why it was commissioned; it's half 'history,' half translated documents (the history portion is sort of a summation of the documents, so it does whack you over the head a bit). However, it was clearly not designed to be some hard hitting work of new theory - I've read a couple of Lee's articles on Sino-Korean collaboration, and he's quite a capable writer.
A few things to take away from this: most counterinsurgency measures are not going to be successful unless there is 'traditional' military conflict first, and the Japanese experience was no different. Lee lists five counterinsurgency measures, and only the first is distinctly militaristic (paramilitary operations). The rest (separating insurgents from the masses, 'purification' and reform of towns and villages, reconstruction of towns, propaganda and pacification measures) are targeted not at insurgents, but the base necessary for insurgents to exist.
Much attention is paid to the Japanese method of moving people to 'collective hamlets.' These served as defensive units and as a way to cut off the insurgents from food supplies and supporters (probably the most important aspect in fighting insurgents); unfortunately, since defense & the counterinsurgency campaigns were the primary targets, the life of a number of farmers did worsen in overcrowded conditions (in short, not enough attention was paid to the variety of conditions that existed in Manchuria, heavily depended on geography and terrain). Still, there were some 'progressive' measures taken; reading the primary documents, it does seem that a number of Japanese had a firm grasp on the necessity of keeping people happy (even if it wasn't always so successful). I hesitate to say that they took a 'light touch' with the (non-insurgent) masses, but there is certainly an element of 'making ourselves more attractive than the opposition by providing real and concrete improvements to daily life' here.
Apparently by '40, the insurgency was more or less crushed. I'm not clear on what other elements were involved (bandits and secret society groups are mentioned very briefly) - the bulk of attention is paid to Communist elements, Chinese Communists at that (Lee mentions the Minshengtuan incident which really wreaked havoc on collaboration between Chinese & Korean CP members).