Занятно о стоимости акционерного капитала
Этот к тому, что стоимость сама по себе не должна являться единственным мерилом успеха.
Чхан Ха Джун '23 тайны....
The dumbest idea in the world
Limited liability has allowed huge progress in human productive power by enabling the amassing of huge amounts of capital, exactly because it has offered shareholders an easy exit, thereby reducing the risk involved in any investment. However, at the same time, this very ease of exit is exactly what makes the shareholders unreliable guardians of a company’s long-term future. This is why most rich countries outside the Anglo-American world have tried to reduce the influence of free-floating shareholders and maintain (or even create) a group of long-term stakeholders (including some shareholders) through various formal and informal means. In many countries, the government has held sizeable share ownership in key enterprises - either directly (e.g., Renault in France, Volkswagen in Germany) or indirectly through ownership by state-owned banks (e.g., France, Korea) - and acted as a stable shareholder. As mentioned above, countries like Sweden allowed differential voting rights for different classes of shares, which enabled the founding families to retain significant control over the corporation while raising additional capital. In some countries, there are formal representations by workers, who have a greater long-term orientation than floating shareholders, in company management (e.g., the presence of union representatives on company supervisory boards in Germany). In Japan, companies have minimized the influence of floating shareholders through cross-shareholding among friendly companies. As a result, professional managers and floating shareholders have found it much more difficult to form the ‘unholy alliance’ in these countries, even though they too prefer the shareholder-value-maximization model, given its obvious benefits to them. Being heavily influenced, if not totally controlled, by longer-term stakeholders, companies in these countries do not as easily sack workers, squeeze suppliers, neglect investment and use profits for dividends and share buybacks as American and British companies do. All this means that in the long run they may be more viable than the American or the British companies. Just think about the way in which General Motors has squandered its absolute dominance of the world car industry and finally gone bankrupt while being on the forefront of shareholder value maximization by constantly downsizing and refraining from investment (see Thing 18). The weakness of GM management’s short-term-oriented strategy has been apparent at least from the late 1980s, but the strategy continued until its bankruptcy in 2009, because it made both the managers and the shareholders happy even while debilitating the company. Running companies in the interests of floating shareholders is not only inequitable but also inefficient, not just for the national economy but also for the company itself. As Jack Welch recently confessed, shareholder value is probably the ‘dumbest idea in the world’.
Оригинал доступен на сайте КнигоГид https://knigogid.ru/books/574385-23-things-they-dont-tell-you-about-capitalism/toread/page-7
ЗЫ. И вообще как-то о трансформации восприятия института ограниченной ответственности, а так же ее роли в развитии капитализма нигде мне не попадалось.