I'm sorry I was unable to comment till now - I ended up being quite busy. But better late than never, right?
You've identified and I agree that there are at least two real points in this part of PI. First, Wittgenstein points out that a theory that takes language simply to be reference is taking a part as the whole. He gives a few examples of this sort of error, like defining "games" in such a way that only board games, and not card cames, are included, or defining "tool" such that only hammer and not screw-driver and wrench are included. This is basically the error of defining a thing too narrowly. So the big idea here is that reference, while being an important part of language, is not all of language - there's more to it. And as you notice, this is as much a criticism of his earlier work (with its atomic pieces of language being pictures of atomic facts of the world) as it is a criticism of Augustine.
Second, he gives us some contextualism. You've adequately demonstrated what this is about.
I submit that there is a third theme here. And that is the important "language-game", which is a system of use. I don't actually have a lot to say about language-games, but I do want to talk a bit about the importance of purpose and usefulness in language.
What does it mean when we say that "brick" signifies a certain sort of building material? We mean that the word "brick" is used in certain ways. For instance, we say "bring the red brick", and our friend goes and gets what we wanted him to bring. Or we say "throw the brick through the window", and our friend picks up the object signified and throws it through a window. And so on.
I don't think the actual topic of signification is particularly important here. Rather, it is an example of the way that our talking about language needs to keep in mind the way we use language. Indeed, it seems to be the case that the definition of a word, what a word means, is identical and inseparable from the way we use that word. And, since the way we use a word will change depending on the language-game in which we are involved, the definition of that word will also change depending on context/language-game.
It might be interesting to explore the relationship between context and language-game. I'm not sure I'm clear on the distinction.
One thing that seems important to me is that Wittgenstein seems to be rejecting any sort of "essentialism" in language - that a word has "a meaning" apart from the way we use it, or apart from the context. So the sort of project in which Plato was commonly involved, such as trying to find the essence of Justice or Good or whatever, will seem wrong-headed in a Wittgensteinian perspective. Does this seem correct to you?
You've identified and I agree that there are at least two real points in this part of PI. First, Wittgenstein points out that a theory that takes language simply to be reference is taking a part as the whole. He gives a few examples of this sort of error, like defining "games" in such a way that only board games, and not card cames, are included, or defining "tool" such that only hammer and not screw-driver and wrench are included. This is basically the error of defining a thing too narrowly. So the big idea here is that reference, while being an important part of language, is not all of language - there's more to it. And as you notice, this is as much a criticism of his earlier work (with its atomic pieces of language being pictures of atomic facts of the world) as it is a criticism of Augustine.
Second, he gives us some contextualism. You've adequately demonstrated what this is about.
I submit that there is a third theme here. And that is the important "language-game", which is a system of use. I don't actually have a lot to say about language-games, but I do want to talk a bit about the importance of purpose and usefulness in language.
What does it mean when we say that "brick" signifies a certain sort of building material? We mean that the word "brick" is used in certain ways. For instance, we say "bring the red brick", and our friend goes and gets what we wanted him to bring. Or we say "throw the brick through the window", and our friend picks up the object signified and throws it through a window. And so on.
I don't think the actual topic of signification is particularly important here. Rather, it is an example of the way that our talking about language needs to keep in mind the way we use language. Indeed, it seems to be the case that the definition of a word, what a word means, is identical and inseparable from the way we use that word. And, since the way we use a word will change depending on the language-game in which we are involved, the definition of that word will also change depending on context/language-game.
It might be interesting to explore the relationship between context and language-game. I'm not sure I'm clear on the distinction.
One thing that seems important to me is that Wittgenstein seems to be rejecting any sort of "essentialism" in language - that a word has "a meaning" apart from the way we use it, or apart from the context. So the sort of project in which Plato was commonly involved, such as trying to find the essence of Justice or Good or whatever, will seem wrong-headed in a Wittgensteinian perspective. Does this seem correct to you?
Reply
Leave a comment