Arab Rulers and Arab Military
Dr. Vladimir Ahmedov
Arab Regimes and Arab Military
(Part III)
The experience of modern Arab history shows that social and political developments in the Arab countries after they have achieved their independence promoted strengthening of the role of military in political sphere.
In fact, the years 1950-1960th in the Arab East were a period of numerous coups in Arab world. Against a background of raising national liberation movements and the struggle for independence, the role of the military in Arab society was extremely high. Practically all Arab countries gained their political independence during this complicated struggle of many ears. The conversion of the army to the nationalists (Egypt, Syria) or forming firm and powerful enough armed troops of national liberation movement (Alger) paved the way for success of this struggle. At that time, every Arab military officer could become his country’s ruler. The armed forces were highly politicizes and politicians generally failed to control them. During this period, the armed forces become the most effective national institutions. In some countries, army was the only capable government unit. Those were the sources of traditional aspiration of Arab countries for preservation and consolidation of their armed forces with the perception of the army in the society as the main guarantor for countries sovereignty and security. The period of 1980-1990-th was shaped by the beginning of the state controlled social and political liberalization in many Arab countries. This process was usually accompanied by the transformation of political systems in these countries. As the result, the authoritarian measures of administration have come more and more into conflict with the complicated problems of the social economic developments.
In 2000-th Arab rulers have more and more strived for control the activity of armed forces trying to limit the influence of the military on the external and internal policy of their countries. In conformity with the Arab realities, it means the search of effective tools, which can prevent military officers from staging any fresh coups, and to turn them from main rival into allay of the state power and its preserver.
In order to win the armed forces backing Arab governments used several policies and methods. There were two general ways used by politicians to ensure that the military did not tray to seize power. First, they acted through individual material incentives and financial support for army as a whole. High-ranking officers were helped by high salaries and special privileges. As a rule, the Arab military often had more influence than civilians governments do have in matters concerning the spending of national budgets items and in obtain the material financing support from the state. Expensive weapons purchases are often undertaken were based on preferences of several representatives of military elite and suppose to satisfy some ruler’s egos, national prestige and ensure the deterrence of regional threats. For all that, it less taken into account the real needs of such advanced weapons and capabilities of national armies to cope with them in proper way. The Gulf Arab monarchies are a good example for this. Since the end I Gulf War (1991) up to the end of 1990th Middle East states have spent for arms purchases 20% GNP and 55% of their budget costs. Between 1986 and 1993, only GCC countries bought the weapons for 82, 5 billion dollars that makes up 31% of all costs for military purchases.
One of the biggest importers of the weapons in the Middle East - Saudi Arabia - sets a good example for this. Between 1984 and 1998, the cost of all weapons imported in the kingdom exceeded 150 billion dollars. Now days they continue such a practice as well.
The orientation of the Middle Eastern countries for growth their military expenditures affected their foreign policy. For Gulf Arab monarchies, the motive for huge arms purchases from the United States and Great Britain determined by the aspiration of their rulers to enlist the support of great western powers for guaranteeing their security. Because of seeking protection and prestige, they practically ignore the question of creating a more effective military establishment capable to ensure the effective use of weapons. For example, the United Arab Emirates have recently used to buy advanced planes for which it did not have pilots, or even, suitable runways.
The policies have taken by Arab rulers during the last 20 years to avoid the active participation of military in the politics brought their positive results. In the near past only two Arab rulers - Egyptian presidents H. Mubarak and Libyan leader M. Kaddafi could say that they are in power because they were career military officers. With this, the two leaders left active duty more than a quarter century ago.
For the purpose of ensure reliable conditions to prevent the military from spontaneous interference in the politics. As well as to transmute the army into force fully dependent on the ruling regime and objectively interested in caring out political and economic reforms, the former president of Egypt H. Mubarak followed a successive policy of depolitization the armed forces. Because of this policy «over classes» nature of the military caste was washed out and their independent role were seriously reduced Egyptian legislation prohibited the military to engage in politics and participate in the work of political parties and organizations. As a main means of this policy the rulers practices a wide spread involvement of servicemen in the economic life of Egypt. The government granted the military different economics and legal privileges for their economic activities. Following such policy, the military at the beginning of 1990th have become predominant element in the joint ventures defense type. They also cooperated with privet capital in the economic spheres.
The late Syrian president H. Assad and his successor B. Assad have solved the same problems by the same means. For ten years of his rule, B. Assad has formed a new regular corps of ruling elite preparing for meet eventual political challengers in the unstable situation.
In Alger, the ruling party National Liberation Front was for a long time a deterrent factor for the army. The appearance in the army command a new generation of the officers who got modern education allowed in the mid of 1990th to take a decision of gradual transition to professional army. To no small degree, such a step determined by the danger of isolation of Algerian armed forces taking into account intensive Islamic propaganda in the troops and unreliability of the recruits. The fact of such decision signified however gradual breaking of the army out of the politics.
Many Arab countries instituted specific forms of control over the army to balance the army’s role as a single internal «power center» and not allow the strengthening military influence on the civil society.
To be continued.
Arab Regimes and Arab Military
(Part III)
The experience of modern Arab history shows that social and political developments in the Arab countries after they have achieved their independence promoted strengthening of the role of military in political sphere.
In fact, the years 1950-1960th in the Arab East were a period of numerous coups in Arab world. Against a background of raising national liberation movements and the struggle for independence, the role of the military in Arab society was extremely high. Practically all Arab countries gained their political independence during this complicated struggle of many ears. The conversion of the army to the nationalists (Egypt, Syria) or forming firm and powerful enough armed troops of national liberation movement (Alger) paved the way for success of this struggle. At that time, every Arab military officer could become his country’s ruler. The armed forces were highly politicizes and politicians generally failed to control them. During this period, the armed forces become the most effective national institutions. In some countries, army was the only capable government unit. Those were the sources of traditional aspiration of Arab countries for preservation and consolidation of their armed forces with the perception of the army in the society as the main guarantor for countries sovereignty and security. The period of 1980-1990-th was shaped by the beginning of the state controlled social and political liberalization in many Arab countries. This process was usually accompanied by the transformation of political systems in these countries. As the result, the authoritarian measures of administration have come more and more into conflict with the complicated problems of the social economic developments.
In 2000-th Arab rulers have more and more strived for control the activity of armed forces trying to limit the influence of the military on the external and internal policy of their countries. In conformity with the Arab realities, it means the search of effective tools, which can prevent military officers from staging any fresh coups, and to turn them from main rival into allay of the state power and its preserver.
In order to win the armed forces backing Arab governments used several policies and methods. There were two general ways used by politicians to ensure that the military did not tray to seize power. First, they acted through individual material incentives and financial support for army as a whole. High-ranking officers were helped by high salaries and special privileges. As a rule, the Arab military often had more influence than civilians governments do have in matters concerning the spending of national budgets items and in obtain the material financing support from the state. Expensive weapons purchases are often undertaken were based on preferences of several representatives of military elite and suppose to satisfy some ruler’s egos, national prestige and ensure the deterrence of regional threats. For all that, it less taken into account the real needs of such advanced weapons and capabilities of national armies to cope with them in proper way. The Gulf Arab monarchies are a good example for this. Since the end I Gulf War (1991) up to the end of 1990th Middle East states have spent for arms purchases 20% GNP and 55% of their budget costs. Between 1986 and 1993, only GCC countries bought the weapons for 82, 5 billion dollars that makes up 31% of all costs for military purchases.
One of the biggest importers of the weapons in the Middle East - Saudi Arabia - sets a good example for this. Between 1984 and 1998, the cost of all weapons imported in the kingdom exceeded 150 billion dollars. Now days they continue such a practice as well.
The orientation of the Middle Eastern countries for growth their military expenditures affected their foreign policy. For Gulf Arab monarchies, the motive for huge arms purchases from the United States and Great Britain determined by the aspiration of their rulers to enlist the support of great western powers for guaranteeing their security. Because of seeking protection and prestige, they practically ignore the question of creating a more effective military establishment capable to ensure the effective use of weapons. For example, the United Arab Emirates have recently used to buy advanced planes for which it did not have pilots, or even, suitable runways.
The policies have taken by Arab rulers during the last 20 years to avoid the active participation of military in the politics brought their positive results. In the near past only two Arab rulers - Egyptian presidents H. Mubarak and Libyan leader M. Kaddafi could say that they are in power because they were career military officers. With this, the two leaders left active duty more than a quarter century ago.
For the purpose of ensure reliable conditions to prevent the military from spontaneous interference in the politics. As well as to transmute the army into force fully dependent on the ruling regime and objectively interested in caring out political and economic reforms, the former president of Egypt H. Mubarak followed a successive policy of depolitization the armed forces. Because of this policy «over classes» nature of the military caste was washed out and their independent role were seriously reduced Egyptian legislation prohibited the military to engage in politics and participate in the work of political parties and organizations. As a main means of this policy the rulers practices a wide spread involvement of servicemen in the economic life of Egypt. The government granted the military different economics and legal privileges for their economic activities. Following such policy, the military at the beginning of 1990th have become predominant element in the joint ventures defense type. They also cooperated with privet capital in the economic spheres.
The late Syrian president H. Assad and his successor B. Assad have solved the same problems by the same means. For ten years of his rule, B. Assad has formed a new regular corps of ruling elite preparing for meet eventual political challengers in the unstable situation.
In Alger, the ruling party National Liberation Front was for a long time a deterrent factor for the army. The appearance in the army command a new generation of the officers who got modern education allowed in the mid of 1990th to take a decision of gradual transition to professional army. To no small degree, such a step determined by the danger of isolation of Algerian armed forces taking into account intensive Islamic propaganda in the troops and unreliability of the recruits. The fact of such decision signified however gradual breaking of the army out of the politics.
Many Arab countries instituted specific forms of control over the army to balance the army’s role as a single internal «power center» and not allow the strengthening military influence on the civil society.
To be continued.