Война - неразрывность (целостность) в изменении и изменение в неразрывности
Все руки не доходят настоятельно порекомендовать интересующимся последнюю статью живого классика военной стратегии Колина Грея (Colin S. Gray) в Parameters.
War - Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity
by Colin S. Gray
Parameters, Summer 2010, Vol. 40, No. 2
Я даже порекомендую сделать это не специалистам, - попробовать «разгрызть». Это поможет получить достаточно полное и глубокое представление о войне и мире и стратегии. Тогда можно будет с чистой совестью ориентироваться, не переварив монографии. Все наиболее важное уместилось на нескольких листах.
Внутренне съежился от контекста 21 века, как его видит он. Как воевать в такой среде Армении пока что представляю с трудом. Не удержусь и вырежу последний кусок и помещу под катом.
Brave New World?
There is nothing of fundamental importance that is genuinely new about war and strategy in the twenty-first century (not even nuclear weapons). The stage sets, the dress, the civilian and military equipment, and some of the language are always changing, but the human, political, and strategic plots, alas, remain all too familiar. The argument is simultaneously profoundly conservative yet thoroughly comfortable with recognition, and sometimes even welcoming, of change. This analysis will close by citing five significant changes in the contexts that shape contemporary war and strategy, and by pointing to three caveats that should help encourage respect for more classical analysis.
• The development of cyber power that is becoming ever more necessary for the creation of wealth and the functioning of armed forces already is resulting in cyber warfare. With only trivial exceptions, all future wars will harbor integral cyber warfare.
• The maturing of orbital space capabilities for science, commerce, and military power guarantees that space warfare, in common with cyber warfare, will be in our future.
• The rise of a global electronic media with real-time access to events, or nearly so, and the ability to reach audiences globally means a political and cultural-moral audit of behavior that will be an enduring feature of future strategic history.
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• An information-led revolution in military affairs (RMA) is well under way and is unstoppable. The strategic ramifications of this RMA include the dissemination of relatively high-technology weaponry and support equipment to nonstate and weak-state belligerents. The computer-based, in¬formation technology-led RMA does not mean enduring US military hege¬mony for strategic and political challenges, as some people naively believed in the 1990s.
• Belligerents who find themselves materially challenged will seek strategic compensation primarily by means of adopting asymmetric grand and military strategies that might offset their disadvantages. Irregular warfare, including terrorism, and threats by weapons of mass destruction are the most obvious contemporary asymmetric options. There is nothing new about the concept of asymmetry in war, warfare, and strategy. Sensible combatants always look for a winning edge that can mask and offset their deficiencies.
• Interstate war and warfare continue to plague the human race. Even war between great powers is possible, given the political fuel lurking in the twenty-first century in the deadly and familiar classical Thucydidesan categories of “fear, honor, and interest.” But new technologies very likely will retire, indeed have retired, the tactical relevance of much modern military experience. For a leading example, contemporary kinetic air (and missile) power is now so deadly in the precision with which it can be targeted that just about any enemy assets that can be located can be violently removed from the opponent’s order of battle. Regular, heavy ground forces will not clash in mighty battle, because rival air power(s) will pre-empt such an engagement. Nonetheless, future large-scale and usually “conventional” regular and irregular styles in warfare will still be possible. They will be waged by information technology-led and -enabled military forces, in cyber space as well as to, in, and from orbital space, and in styles notably irregular when compared with most interstate strategic practices in modern times.
Three Closing Caveats
• Particular styles in warfare wax and wane, and wax again, endlessly. An irregular style is dominant for now, but that says nothing of much predictive value regarding the twenty-first century beyond today.
• Every new set of technological marvels brings with it specific novel challenges. For every shiny new solution, new problems will be discovered. The principal reason why this is always so is because of the inconvenience represented by the enemy.
• War/warfare is a duel and a dynamic, unique, and unpredictable product of interaction between friendly and unfriendly forces, together with
13
the workings of friction and chance. No matter what else changes, we can count on historical continuity in the form of a self-willed adversary.
War - Continuity in Change, and Change in Continuity
by Colin S. Gray
Parameters, Summer 2010, Vol. 40, No. 2
Я даже порекомендую сделать это не специалистам, - попробовать «разгрызть». Это поможет получить достаточно полное и глубокое представление о войне и мире и стратегии. Тогда можно будет с чистой совестью ориентироваться, не переварив монографии. Все наиболее важное уместилось на нескольких листах.
Внутренне съежился от контекста 21 века, как его видит он. Как воевать в такой среде Армении пока что представляю с трудом. Не удержусь и вырежу последний кусок и помещу под катом.
Brave New World?
There is nothing of fundamental importance that is genuinely new about war and strategy in the twenty-first century (not even nuclear weapons). The stage sets, the dress, the civilian and military equipment, and some of the language are always changing, but the human, political, and strategic plots, alas, remain all too familiar. The argument is simultaneously profoundly conservative yet thoroughly comfortable with recognition, and sometimes even welcoming, of change. This analysis will close by citing five significant changes in the contexts that shape contemporary war and strategy, and by pointing to three caveats that should help encourage respect for more classical analysis.
• The development of cyber power that is becoming ever more necessary for the creation of wealth and the functioning of armed forces already is resulting in cyber warfare. With only trivial exceptions, all future wars will harbor integral cyber warfare.
• The maturing of orbital space capabilities for science, commerce, and military power guarantees that space warfare, in common with cyber warfare, will be in our future.
• The rise of a global electronic media with real-time access to events, or nearly so, and the ability to reach audiences globally means a political and cultural-moral audit of behavior that will be an enduring feature of future strategic history.
12
• An information-led revolution in military affairs (RMA) is well under way and is unstoppable. The strategic ramifications of this RMA include the dissemination of relatively high-technology weaponry and support equipment to nonstate and weak-state belligerents. The computer-based, in¬formation technology-led RMA does not mean enduring US military hege¬mony for strategic and political challenges, as some people naively believed in the 1990s.
• Belligerents who find themselves materially challenged will seek strategic compensation primarily by means of adopting asymmetric grand and military strategies that might offset their disadvantages. Irregular warfare, including terrorism, and threats by weapons of mass destruction are the most obvious contemporary asymmetric options. There is nothing new about the concept of asymmetry in war, warfare, and strategy. Sensible combatants always look for a winning edge that can mask and offset their deficiencies.
• Interstate war and warfare continue to plague the human race. Even war between great powers is possible, given the political fuel lurking in the twenty-first century in the deadly and familiar classical Thucydidesan categories of “fear, honor, and interest.” But new technologies very likely will retire, indeed have retired, the tactical relevance of much modern military experience. For a leading example, contemporary kinetic air (and missile) power is now so deadly in the precision with which it can be targeted that just about any enemy assets that can be located can be violently removed from the opponent’s order of battle. Regular, heavy ground forces will not clash in mighty battle, because rival air power(s) will pre-empt such an engagement. Nonetheless, future large-scale and usually “conventional” regular and irregular styles in warfare will still be possible. They will be waged by information technology-led and -enabled military forces, in cyber space as well as to, in, and from orbital space, and in styles notably irregular when compared with most interstate strategic practices in modern times.
Three Closing Caveats
• Particular styles in warfare wax and wane, and wax again, endlessly. An irregular style is dominant for now, but that says nothing of much predictive value regarding the twenty-first century beyond today.
• Every new set of technological marvels brings with it specific novel challenges. For every shiny new solution, new problems will be discovered. The principal reason why this is always so is because of the inconvenience represented by the enemy.
• War/warfare is a duel and a dynamic, unique, and unpredictable product of interaction between friendly and unfriendly forces, together with
13
the workings of friction and chance. No matter what else changes, we can count on historical continuity in the form of a self-willed adversary.