Focus and Context
There is a need to get more focus into the project, to pick up the pathway and assign priorities to the different elements.
1. One component is the Mises, Parsons and Popper project which in turn has three parts (1) to describe the way their programs looked like converging to a very similar position circa 1937 (the date of Parsons' book The Structure of Social Action), (2) to spell out a position based on the best parts of their programs, that is, the point they should have reached and (3) to desribe how their paths diverged and did not meet in a helpfull manner.
Just to anticipate a small part of the story, by the time The Structure of Social Action was in print, Parsons had decided that methodological individualism could not cope with the evolution or description of social structures and he went off into the holism of general systems theory (with the idea that sociology should try to emulate the closed system of classical mechanics as the paradigm of science).
This is the abstract of a paper that is supposed to emerge from the Mises/Parsons/Popper comparison.
During the 1930s three lines of thought converged on a common model of explanation in economics and the human sciences. Working in Europe, Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian school developed what he called "praxeology" to explore the sciences of human action. In the United States, Talcott Parsons, under the influence of Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim and Weber, offered the "action frame of reference" and in Australasia (in exile from Austria) Karl Popper elaborated "situational analysis". Common features of the three models are methodological individualism, the search for universal laws and the use of a rationality principle to link the ends and means of action. General acceptance of the common features of these models would have significantly altered the criteria for theory development and appraisal in economics and the other social sciences. In the event, the three lines of thought did not merge and they did not impact significantly on the scientific community at large. Their potential synergy has yet to be explored and there is scope for a synthesis with some modifications to each of the models, especially to correct the views of Mises and Parsons on the methods that are effective in the natural sciences. A strange feature of the situation is that the three principals and their followers have, up to date, almost completely refrained from serious discussion of the contribution of the other two parties in their published works.
2. Another component is to demonstrate how the theory of metaphysical research programs will help to identify the real bones of contention between rival schools of thought (Kuhn's paradigms and the research programs of Lakatos). The theses here are (1) positivism drove the discussion of metaphysics out of science and (2) various factors subverted the critical discussion of metaphysics in the non-science lines of thought - phenomenology, Critical Theory etc. These factors include failure to engage with science and with practical problems, defective economic theories and obsession with conceptual analysis and the definition of terms (what Popper called essentialism).
Perspective
The Mises/Popper project is a part of a larger project to unpack the consequences of a set of theories (in method, metaphysics, theory of rationality and epistimology) mostly articulated by Popper, with a lot of important input from Bartley on "justificationism", rationality and the limits of criticism.
Popper depicted his metaphysical program in terms of realism vs instrumentalism, objectivism vs subjectivism and indeterminism vs determinism.
To that can be added non-justificationism vs justificationism and his critique of essentialism which is overwhelmingly important in the human sciences.
As noted elseqhere, an "old program" can be spelled out in terms of justificationism, subjectivism, essentialism, determinism and reductionism.
Justificationism. A valid principle of knowledge or value must be derived from some authoritative source, which provides conclusive justification for it.
Subjectivism. Knowledge consists of subjective beliefs or concepts. There is no such thing as a structure or fabric of objective knowledge outside the minds of individual people.
Essentialism. Knowledge either results from penetration into the hidden essence of a phenomenon, or is improved by analysis of the concepts used to describe the phenomenon.
Determinism. Every event is pre-determined, so the future is laid down like the sequence of frames in a reel of film passing through a projector.
Reductionism. Complex things are to be explained by reducing them to their simplest constituents. For example, events in society should he examined in terms of biology and eventually reduced to the laws of physics.
An alternative program can be articulated as follows:
In place of justified beliefs, Popper and Bartley opt for conjectural objective knowledge.
In place of conceptual analysis and debate about the meaning of terms we should argue about the truth or falsity of theories, or, in the realm of action, the desirability of alternative policies.
In place of determinism we need to realise that the future to some extent depends on decisions that we make, and these decisions can be influenced by arguments and ideas which cannot be reduced to the laws of physics, nor to biological instincts nor to immutable social or historical forces.
The idea is to unpack the implications of the revised program in all the potential areas of application. For economics, see Larry Boland on the four-point Popper/Hayek program that he described in his 1982 book (reprinted recently) on the foundations of economic method
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