Robbins R.G. jr.
Famine in Russia 1891-1892: The Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis. New York; London: Columbia University Press,1975.
There are three important myths concerning the famine. The first tells us that the Imperial government tried to ignore the crisis and to suppress all news of the disaster. Second, we learn that when the regime was finally forced to act, its relief measures were inadequate and its officials incompetent. The third myth insists that, because of the government's inactivity and helplessness, the educated public of the country, that is, "society," moved in to fill the gap. Further, despite some opposition from state officials, public-spirited citizens carried out extensive relief work through the zemstvos and private volunteer groups. Their efforts did much to alleviate the sufferings of the peasants and exposed the bankruptcy of the state machine.
This book, based in large part on documents held in Soviet archives, dispels or modifies some of the accepted ideas about the famine, but it does not pretend to be a definitive study of the event. Many aspects of the problem - the economic causes of the disaster, the public's reaction, and the long-term political repercussions caused by the crisis - will be touched on only briefly. The present work concentrates on the formulation of government policy and the operation of state and zemstvo institutions. Its aim will be to show what the regime did to aid the needy in 1891-92 and, as far as is possible, to tell why specific actions were taken.