The Abbasids: Conclusions
I stand by my previous conclusions about this book. In the latter part of the book, the author provide more detail than earlier but he never explores the mechanics of the forces that destroyed the calaphate. This was a deeply religious society and it was “The Commander of the Faithful” that ruled and protected Islam. In the end, the caliph couldn’t pay the army. They’re reaction was to riot, pillage, burn. From riots, civil war grew with battle lines drawn across familiar boundaries. The disenigration of Calaphate quickly followed.
With the income of 500 tons of silver a year (I say that with a cynical inflection), it must have been a case of extreme mismanagement that brought about the fiscal crisis that eventually toppled the caliphate. Factors that exacerbated these unresolvable fiscal problems involved a shifting in the center of power from one class to another. The Abbasid clan and the Muslim Caliphate was founded on a primarily Arab and Persian aristocracy. As the teritorial boundries of the caliphate expanded, Turkish mercenaries were introduced into the ranks of the military. This was to bolster the strength of the fighting force and actually did make a significant difference. The Turks brought with them the riding and riding warfare skills that was the cutting edge of weaponry at the time. It was these Turkish mercenaries that eventually became a dominate force within the government. They exercised complete control over the military but still lacked influence amongst the bureaucrats that ensured that the government functioned properly. They were also considered inferior by the native Arab/Persian population. A classic conflict of Old Money being confronted by the Nuevo Riche. It was the conflict between these rival functionaries that led to the civil strife and chaos that destroyed the caliphate. The Caliph himself eventually was reduced from the Commander of the Faithful, to a puppet for the Turkish Generals that ruled the remains of the Caliphate.
I have been thinking about the clues in the reading that answer some of my concerns. I’m not sure that I understand the relationship of the caliph, the army and the economy (general population). The author states several times that for each caliph, there was an group of power brokers to go with him. This was not equivalent to our own presidental staffing appointments, but closer to the old machine politics of New York and then Chicago. A group of people surrounded a candidate and ensured that he was successful in ascension to power. There was little heed to method. The rewards were worth the effort. Appointments to governorships and other lucrative posts. All manner of positions throughout a vast and complex civil administration needed to be filled and it was this ruling elite surrounding the caliph that made the decisions. There was also a large bonus to the army upon the installation of a new caliph. This was a bribe, pure and simple. These legionares residing in the city, held enormous power due to their position in society and their ability to cause serious harm if provoked. It appears that this was a standing army on the payroll of the state, but it doesn’t sound as if they were very effective. It does appear that they were critical for the economy; their pay was circulated amongst the markets and tradesman in the city and can be that source of outside capital that fuels growth in an economy. It was to try and circumvent this adamant and powerful population that the caliphs brought in the Turks to help fight the wars. This was the cheap immigrant labor of the period.
Time passed and the rivalry between the Turkish generals and the civil service finally broke the system. The generals won; they had the ability to use force, although it was at the cost of corrupting the theory of administration that kept the whole thing running. A competition for resources. Sadly, the resource itself was destroyed in the quest to control it. The land, the people, the markets, the cities, the colonies, all fell into decline and disuse due to the violence. Actually, the story of the scorpion and the toad may be more appropriate.
The time line of the book covers a long enough period so that it’s obvious that the caliphate isn’t lurching from one catastrophe to the next. It creeps along, slowly moving towards the inevitable conclusion. From the distance of 1500 years, it all looks quite simple. Cause and effect. I find this disingenuous. I want to examine it at ground level and compensate for what can be termed “the fog of war”. The administration of such a huge and populace society can only be complex. The geographic impediments seem insurmountable from todays standards. Perhaps the description of the caliph’s life as portrayed in the book is accurate. I stretch my mind and my imagination to picture the societal pressures pushing the caliphate into the quagmire that eventually destroyed it and the image is lacking. The point is that the caliphate couldn’t see it either. The world view of the caliph, his viziers, and the rest of his administration was as narrow and obstructed as the one I had gathered from the book. The empire the caliphate set out to create was tougher to builld than the tools it had available. The tragety of the story is that the caliphate they never understood this.
With the income of 500 tons of silver a year (I say that with a cynical inflection), it must have been a case of extreme mismanagement that brought about the fiscal crisis that eventually toppled the caliphate. Factors that exacerbated these unresolvable fiscal problems involved a shifting in the center of power from one class to another. The Abbasid clan and the Muslim Caliphate was founded on a primarily Arab and Persian aristocracy. As the teritorial boundries of the caliphate expanded, Turkish mercenaries were introduced into the ranks of the military. This was to bolster the strength of the fighting force and actually did make a significant difference. The Turks brought with them the riding and riding warfare skills that was the cutting edge of weaponry at the time. It was these Turkish mercenaries that eventually became a dominate force within the government. They exercised complete control over the military but still lacked influence amongst the bureaucrats that ensured that the government functioned properly. They were also considered inferior by the native Arab/Persian population. A classic conflict of Old Money being confronted by the Nuevo Riche. It was the conflict between these rival functionaries that led to the civil strife and chaos that destroyed the caliphate. The Caliph himself eventually was reduced from the Commander of the Faithful, to a puppet for the Turkish Generals that ruled the remains of the Caliphate.
I have been thinking about the clues in the reading that answer some of my concerns. I’m not sure that I understand the relationship of the caliph, the army and the economy (general population). The author states several times that for each caliph, there was an group of power brokers to go with him. This was not equivalent to our own presidental staffing appointments, but closer to the old machine politics of New York and then Chicago. A group of people surrounded a candidate and ensured that he was successful in ascension to power. There was little heed to method. The rewards were worth the effort. Appointments to governorships and other lucrative posts. All manner of positions throughout a vast and complex civil administration needed to be filled and it was this ruling elite surrounding the caliph that made the decisions. There was also a large bonus to the army upon the installation of a new caliph. This was a bribe, pure and simple. These legionares residing in the city, held enormous power due to their position in society and their ability to cause serious harm if provoked. It appears that this was a standing army on the payroll of the state, but it doesn’t sound as if they were very effective. It does appear that they were critical for the economy; their pay was circulated amongst the markets and tradesman in the city and can be that source of outside capital that fuels growth in an economy. It was to try and circumvent this adamant and powerful population that the caliphs brought in the Turks to help fight the wars. This was the cheap immigrant labor of the period.
Time passed and the rivalry between the Turkish generals and the civil service finally broke the system. The generals won; they had the ability to use force, although it was at the cost of corrupting the theory of administration that kept the whole thing running. A competition for resources. Sadly, the resource itself was destroyed in the quest to control it. The land, the people, the markets, the cities, the colonies, all fell into decline and disuse due to the violence. Actually, the story of the scorpion and the toad may be more appropriate.
The time line of the book covers a long enough period so that it’s obvious that the caliphate isn’t lurching from one catastrophe to the next. It creeps along, slowly moving towards the inevitable conclusion. From the distance of 1500 years, it all looks quite simple. Cause and effect. I find this disingenuous. I want to examine it at ground level and compensate for what can be termed “the fog of war”. The administration of such a huge and populace society can only be complex. The geographic impediments seem insurmountable from todays standards. Perhaps the description of the caliph’s life as portrayed in the book is accurate. I stretch my mind and my imagination to picture the societal pressures pushing the caliphate into the quagmire that eventually destroyed it and the image is lacking. The point is that the caliphate couldn’t see it either. The world view of the caliph, his viziers, and the rest of his administration was as narrow and obstructed as the one I had gathered from the book. The empire the caliphate set out to create was tougher to builld than the tools it had available. The tragety of the story is that the caliphate they never understood this.