«Knowledge»: What gets credited and reported
Positivism is overrated. I am not talking about being positive in life. I am rather talking about a specific outlook on knowledge - a paradigm if you will - with specific ontological, epistemological and methodological dimensions.
In a nutshell, positivism is really into hypothetico-deductive analysis, and into blinding itself it is possible to be truly objective. The end result is: positivists are absorbed into their own theoretical grid, which is bound to constrain them to pre-set variables. That is, they are not receptive to emergent variables or divergent data when doing their research. They have to stick to the master hypothesis-verification plan. Then, they are blissfully unaware that the very definition of variables (ex: what is, exactly, «sexual orientation»? or «cultural origin»?), the selection of those variables (ex: what indicators would allow us to measure poverty?), the collection of data related to those variables, and the interpretation of correlation links that are found imply subjective decisions. Scientific rigor is very important, but it requires that we be extremely cautious so as to never presume we are being objective, even when we have enacted all the controls we thought were necessary.
Here is an extract from Hawkesworth, Mary. (2006). Feminist Inquiry: From political conviction to methodological innovation. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p.2.
Why should feminist scholars be concerned with seemingly abstract questions about the nature of knowledge and defensible strategies of knowledge production? To understand how such abstract questions can have palpable effects on the lives of contemporary women and men, consider the following exemple.
The New York Times Science Section recently featured "New Clues to Women Veiled in Black", an article covering the latest "scientific breakthrough" in the understanding of depression (Gilbert, 2004). Twenty-five years after feminist scholars testified before the U.S. Congress about the gendered nature of depression, medical science has acknowledged that depression affects twice as many women as men, and a number of scientists are now trying to explain this disparity. Within feminist scholarship many factors have been identified that contribute to the higher incidence of depression among women: low wages, higher levels of poverty, childhood sexual abuse, rape and domestic violence, stresses related to single-parenthood, the challenge of meeting the competing demands of work and family responsibilities, inadequate leasure time, sexism, racism, and homophobia. These factors are given short shrift in the new "scientific" explanations of the prevalence of depression among women. Instead, the scientists advanced two alternative accounts: The first contends that "about half the risk of depression is thought to be genetic", the second, the newest "scientific theory", links the development of depression to "negative thinking" or "overthinking", "a tendency to dwell on petty slights, to mentally replay testy encounters and to wallow in sad feelings". According to the New York Times article, "studies show how this type of negative thinking is far more common in women than in men" (Gilbert, 2004, F1). On this view, women are prone to wallow in their misery, nurse their wounds, dwell too long on the recollection of harms that have befallen them, while men have the capacity to let things go. Hence, more women are depressed than men. The article recommands a book, Women Who Think Too Much, by Dr. Susan Nolen-Hoecksema for "a variety of strategies to help teenage and adult women cut down on overthing" (F1).
In this instance, as in many others, feminist analysis of women's lives provides a radically different account from that advanced by nonfeminists. Which view is correct? Resolving this question is not a matter of idle speculation. The quality of millions of women's lives is at stake. The remedies that follow from these divergent explanations of depression also vary significantly. Psychologists and medical practitioners often prescribe mood-altering drugs for depressed women. Feminist scholars, including feminist psychologists and medical practitioners, suggest that, although such therapeutic interventions for particular individuals who can afford them might alleviate immediate symptoms, they are radically incomplete, for they do not address the social causes of depression. Moreover, remedies that «privatize» the problem of depression, treating it solely as an individual problem, may intentionaly or unintentionaly «blame the victim». As is so clearly demonstrated in the «overthinking theory», women are held responsible for excessive rumination about harms that befall them, while little attention is paid to the underlying social practices that cause the harms. Rather than self-help «advice» books, feminist prescriptions for depression require social transformation in addition to efforts to address the symptoms of particular women.
In a nutshell, positivism is really into hypothetico-deductive analysis, and into blinding itself it is possible to be truly objective. The end result is: positivists are absorbed into their own theoretical grid, which is bound to constrain them to pre-set variables. That is, they are not receptive to emergent variables or divergent data when doing their research. They have to stick to the master hypothesis-verification plan. Then, they are blissfully unaware that the very definition of variables (ex: what is, exactly, «sexual orientation»? or «cultural origin»?), the selection of those variables (ex: what indicators would allow us to measure poverty?), the collection of data related to those variables, and the interpretation of correlation links that are found imply subjective decisions. Scientific rigor is very important, but it requires that we be extremely cautious so as to never presume we are being objective, even when we have enacted all the controls we thought were necessary.
Here is an extract from Hawkesworth, Mary. (2006). Feminist Inquiry: From political conviction to methodological innovation. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, p.2.
Why should feminist scholars be concerned with seemingly abstract questions about the nature of knowledge and defensible strategies of knowledge production? To understand how such abstract questions can have palpable effects on the lives of contemporary women and men, consider the following exemple.
The New York Times Science Section recently featured "New Clues to Women Veiled in Black", an article covering the latest "scientific breakthrough" in the understanding of depression (Gilbert, 2004). Twenty-five years after feminist scholars testified before the U.S. Congress about the gendered nature of depression, medical science has acknowledged that depression affects twice as many women as men, and a number of scientists are now trying to explain this disparity. Within feminist scholarship many factors have been identified that contribute to the higher incidence of depression among women: low wages, higher levels of poverty, childhood sexual abuse, rape and domestic violence, stresses related to single-parenthood, the challenge of meeting the competing demands of work and family responsibilities, inadequate leasure time, sexism, racism, and homophobia. These factors are given short shrift in the new "scientific" explanations of the prevalence of depression among women. Instead, the scientists advanced two alternative accounts: The first contends that "about half the risk of depression is thought to be genetic", the second, the newest "scientific theory", links the development of depression to "negative thinking" or "overthinking", "a tendency to dwell on petty slights, to mentally replay testy encounters and to wallow in sad feelings". According to the New York Times article, "studies show how this type of negative thinking is far more common in women than in men" (Gilbert, 2004, F1). On this view, women are prone to wallow in their misery, nurse their wounds, dwell too long on the recollection of harms that have befallen them, while men have the capacity to let things go. Hence, more women are depressed than men. The article recommands a book, Women Who Think Too Much, by Dr. Susan Nolen-Hoecksema for "a variety of strategies to help teenage and adult women cut down on overthing" (F1).
In this instance, as in many others, feminist analysis of women's lives provides a radically different account from that advanced by nonfeminists. Which view is correct? Resolving this question is not a matter of idle speculation. The quality of millions of women's lives is at stake. The remedies that follow from these divergent explanations of depression also vary significantly. Psychologists and medical practitioners often prescribe mood-altering drugs for depressed women. Feminist scholars, including feminist psychologists and medical practitioners, suggest that, although such therapeutic interventions for particular individuals who can afford them might alleviate immediate symptoms, they are radically incomplete, for they do not address the social causes of depression. Moreover, remedies that «privatize» the problem of depression, treating it solely as an individual problem, may intentionaly or unintentionaly «blame the victim». As is so clearly demonstrated in the «overthinking theory», women are held responsible for excessive rumination about harms that befall them, while little attention is paid to the underlying social practices that cause the harms. Rather than self-help «advice» books, feminist prescriptions for depression require social transformation in addition to efforts to address the symptoms of particular women.