Philosophy Essay
It's done!!! And it's How does Descartes attempt to defeat the sceptic? Does he succeed?
Introduction
In this essay, I will look at how Descartes attempts to defeat the sceptic. Firstly, I will do this by examining scepticism, and the Sceptical Crisis. Next, I will examine Methodological Doubt, the way in which Descartes refuses to believe in anything which does not appear to be entirely certain. This involves discussing the ideas of ‘Illusions of Sense’, the ‘Argument from Dreaming’, and the ‘Malicious Demon’. In order to avoid the ‘sceptic’s conclusion’, Descartes postulates the existence of a ‘Criterion of Truth’; this is a special feature of a belief that is certain. He discovers one belief that is immune to all possible doubt- the belief that he exists or ‘Cogito ergo sum’. I will examine this conclusion closely and see whether it does indeed refute scepticism by providing a proposition known with complete certainty.
The Sceptical Crisis
A sceptic in the philosophical sense is one who doubts or denies knowledge through argument. The aim of scepticism is ‘tranquillity in matters of opinion.’ In other words, sceptics believe that everything is controversial and nothing is certain- there are equal and opposite views for every belief.
During the 16th Century, Pyrrhonism (a school of scepticism) had become a major intellectual force, and was undermining confidence in the old authorities such as Aristotle. Descartes’ goal was to defeat scepticism in a way that Pyrrhonists themselves could not refute. He did this by applying Methodological Doubt (a method of reasoned scepticism). Pyrrhonism attacks the possibility of knowledge by the sceptic’s argument:
P1. Knowledge requires certainty
P2.We can never attain certainty about anything
C. We know nothing.
Some modern epistemologists reject P1 in order to avoid the sceptic’s conclusion (C), but as Descartes accepts P1, he must reject P2 to avoid C. Therefore Descartes must find at least one thing that is certain to refute the sceptic’s conclusion.
Methodological Doubt
Also known as Cartesian scepticism, Methodological Doubt is the doubting of all things which cannot be justified through logic.
‘Many of our beliefs were acquired in childhood before we attained the use of reason... our beliefs constitute a shaky edifice on rotten foundations’
The solution according to Descartes was to use doubt as a means of achieving certainty, even if what is ‘certain’ is that certainty cannot be attained. If I consider any one of my beliefs, for example:
‘The capital city of Spain is Madrid’
How do I know that the information is correct if I cannot reconstruct the way in which I can justify this belief? Beliefs are derived from sense, authority, or reason, any one of which is fallible; therefore any one of my beliefs may be mistaken, so I must assume that all of my beliefs may be mistaken.
Illusions of Sense
Everything I have accepted to be most true has come from my senses. However the senses do deceive us; square towers appear round from far away, distant stars appear smaller than they are, or pain may be felt in an amputated limb. Descartes said ‘It a mark of prudence never to place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even once’ . It may not necessarily be the senses deceiving us, as it ‘is possible for a tower to look round, without my believing that the tower is round’ . However, there are cases such as mirages where false beliefs are induced by the senses.
Argument from Dreaming
Next, Descartes considers the question ‘How do I know that I am not dreaming?’ If I cannot distinguish a dream from reality, then there is a possibility that either I cannot distinguish waking moments from dreams, or reality is an illusion or permanent dream.
The Malicious Demon
Hyperbolic doubt creates the ‘malicious demon’, an omnipotent being which deceives me (the meditator) in every possible way. If I cannot refute that reality is a dream or that a malicious demon exists, I cannot trust any of my beliefs. To find one certain thing the meditator must concentrate on a priori knowledge (beliefs independent of experience).
Criterion of Truth
In finding one certain belief, Descartes hoped to find a criterion of truth. There are three possibilities for this leading to more knowledge:
1) It may act as an axiom or postulate from which more knowledge can be derived
2) It may contain connections to other knowledge, or be part of a system of knowledge
3) It may contain information about how to find certainty, or a method of finding knowledge.
The Cogito
Descartes realised there is one belief that is absolutely certain: ‘I exist’ cannot possibly be doubted and cannot be the result of deception. I cannot be deceived into thinking I exist by an evil demon, because I must exist if he is deceiving me. The original Latin reads ‘cogito ergo sum’ - I am thinking, therefore I exist. For this reason, this argument is referred to as the cogito.
The cogito also only works for ‘cogito ergo sum’. ‘Ambulo ergo sum’ does not work since I can doubt that I am walking. The inference is valid but the argument is not sound as the premise is uncertain.
However, the ‘I’ still remains unanalysed. The most famous objection came from Georg Lichtenberg, who contended only that ‘there is thinking going on’ and that I am not entitled to conclude ‘I exist’, as this implies a connection to a substance to which the thoughts belong.
The ‘thin reading’ of the cogito proposes that the ‘I’ refers only to the thoughts that are present in the course of the cogito investigation (nothing can be said of past or future), so it follows that Lichtenberg’s objection would not be applicable here, except in questioning why a stream of thoughts should be called an ‘I’.
However, Descartes contradicts the ‘thin reading’ by saying ‘a thought cannot exist without a thing that is thinking... no act or accident can exist without a substance for it to belong to’ I then conclude that I am a thinking substance, but there are no claims about its connection to the body. A third interpretation of the cogito is that it is an immaterial thinking substance, distinct from the body. This interpretation has been rejected in several places, however in the Sixth Meditation Descartes builds upon the Second to reach the conclusion that mind and body are separate.
‘I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.’ It is true that when thinking, I am unable to deny my own existence; it is analogous to answering ‘absent’ when the register is called in a class.
This is a pragmatic paradox- ‘by attempting to doubt that you exist, you produce evidence to the contrary’ . In this way, the conclusion is reached in a non-inferential manner (without the need for more evidence), and is recognised as self-evident by a ‘simple intuition’ of the mind. A simple intuition is something that can be ‘seen all at once’- in this case, the act of a single thought gives the awareness of the existence of a thinking thing .
However, some prefer to think of the cogito as a logical argument or syllogism (an argument by deductive inference). In this case, an additional premise is required:
P1. ?
P2. I think
C. I exist
The additional major premise (P1) could be: Whatever thinks, exists.
Descartes does not agree that P1 is required, as it is experienced by the meditator to be true. However, if Descartes is allowing a ‘thinking-substance’, he may claim that thoughts can only exist within a substance. In this case, an additional premise concerning this ‘substance’ seems necessary:
P1. Whatever thinks exists
P2. No act or accident can exist without belonging to a substance
P3. I think
C. I exist as a substance that thinks.
Descartes claims P1 and P2, collectively the ‘major premise’, ‘appears so evident to the understanding that we cannot but believe it, even though this might be the first time in our life we have thought of it.’ But these premises aren’t mentioned in Meditation Two, and under methodological doubt we should not believe anything, even what appears evident. If these premises are needed for the cogito, the inference seems to fail as presupposing P1 and P2 contradicts methodological doubt.
In response, Descartes says ‘I think, therefore I am’ contains an implicit ‘major premise’, which might be learned from the meditator’s own case as her experience of thinking serves as a single piece of evidence for existing. ‘Everything needed is grasped in a single intuitive act of thought’ rather than through a syllogism. The use of ‘I am, I exist’ in the Meditations, as opposed to ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ is important to note, as neither ‘therefore’, nor ‘I think’ appear in the text, which dissuades the meditator from reading the cogito as a syllogism. So P1 and P2 are implicitly assumed in reaching the conclusion; this is accepted by the meditator, and then it can be analysed to discover its logical structure.
The cogito offers me the first certainty about anything, and shows a way of attaining knowledge without falling into the sceptic’s conclusion.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have examined how Descartes attempted to defeat the sceptic. I have done this by looking at scepticism, examining Methodological Doubt, and discussing the idea that our sense, authority and reason can be fooled. I have discussed the ‘Criterion of Truth’ postulated by Descartes and I discovered one belief that is immune to all possible doubt- ‘I think, I exist’ or ‘Cogito ergo sum’. I think the conclusion does indeed refute scepticism by providing a proposition known with complete certainty, however many objections have been made in various ways about the cogito, and the nature of the cogito is still in ongoing debate.
Introduction
In this essay, I will look at how Descartes attempts to defeat the sceptic. Firstly, I will do this by examining scepticism, and the Sceptical Crisis. Next, I will examine Methodological Doubt, the way in which Descartes refuses to believe in anything which does not appear to be entirely certain. This involves discussing the ideas of ‘Illusions of Sense’, the ‘Argument from Dreaming’, and the ‘Malicious Demon’. In order to avoid the ‘sceptic’s conclusion’, Descartes postulates the existence of a ‘Criterion of Truth’; this is a special feature of a belief that is certain. He discovers one belief that is immune to all possible doubt- the belief that he exists or ‘Cogito ergo sum’. I will examine this conclusion closely and see whether it does indeed refute scepticism by providing a proposition known with complete certainty.
The Sceptical Crisis
A sceptic in the philosophical sense is one who doubts or denies knowledge through argument. The aim of scepticism is ‘tranquillity in matters of opinion.’ In other words, sceptics believe that everything is controversial and nothing is certain- there are equal and opposite views for every belief.
During the 16th Century, Pyrrhonism (a school of scepticism) had become a major intellectual force, and was undermining confidence in the old authorities such as Aristotle. Descartes’ goal was to defeat scepticism in a way that Pyrrhonists themselves could not refute. He did this by applying Methodological Doubt (a method of reasoned scepticism). Pyrrhonism attacks the possibility of knowledge by the sceptic’s argument:
P1. Knowledge requires certainty
P2.We can never attain certainty about anything
C. We know nothing.
Some modern epistemologists reject P1 in order to avoid the sceptic’s conclusion (C), but as Descartes accepts P1, he must reject P2 to avoid C. Therefore Descartes must find at least one thing that is certain to refute the sceptic’s conclusion.
Methodological Doubt
Also known as Cartesian scepticism, Methodological Doubt is the doubting of all things which cannot be justified through logic.
‘Many of our beliefs were acquired in childhood before we attained the use of reason... our beliefs constitute a shaky edifice on rotten foundations’
The solution according to Descartes was to use doubt as a means of achieving certainty, even if what is ‘certain’ is that certainty cannot be attained. If I consider any one of my beliefs, for example:
‘The capital city of Spain is Madrid’
How do I know that the information is correct if I cannot reconstruct the way in which I can justify this belief? Beliefs are derived from sense, authority, or reason, any one of which is fallible; therefore any one of my beliefs may be mistaken, so I must assume that all of my beliefs may be mistaken.
Illusions of Sense
Everything I have accepted to be most true has come from my senses. However the senses do deceive us; square towers appear round from far away, distant stars appear smaller than they are, or pain may be felt in an amputated limb. Descartes said ‘It a mark of prudence never to place our complete trust in those who have deceived us even once’ . It may not necessarily be the senses deceiving us, as it ‘is possible for a tower to look round, without my believing that the tower is round’ . However, there are cases such as mirages where false beliefs are induced by the senses.
Argument from Dreaming
Next, Descartes considers the question ‘How do I know that I am not dreaming?’ If I cannot distinguish a dream from reality, then there is a possibility that either I cannot distinguish waking moments from dreams, or reality is an illusion or permanent dream.
The Malicious Demon
Hyperbolic doubt creates the ‘malicious demon’, an omnipotent being which deceives me (the meditator) in every possible way. If I cannot refute that reality is a dream or that a malicious demon exists, I cannot trust any of my beliefs. To find one certain thing the meditator must concentrate on a priori knowledge (beliefs independent of experience).
Criterion of Truth
In finding one certain belief, Descartes hoped to find a criterion of truth. There are three possibilities for this leading to more knowledge:
1) It may act as an axiom or postulate from which more knowledge can be derived
2) It may contain connections to other knowledge, or be part of a system of knowledge
3) It may contain information about how to find certainty, or a method of finding knowledge.
The Cogito
Descartes realised there is one belief that is absolutely certain: ‘I exist’ cannot possibly be doubted and cannot be the result of deception. I cannot be deceived into thinking I exist by an evil demon, because I must exist if he is deceiving me. The original Latin reads ‘cogito ergo sum’ - I am thinking, therefore I exist. For this reason, this argument is referred to as the cogito.
The cogito also only works for ‘cogito ergo sum’. ‘Ambulo ergo sum’ does not work since I can doubt that I am walking. The inference is valid but the argument is not sound as the premise is uncertain.
However, the ‘I’ still remains unanalysed. The most famous objection came from Georg Lichtenberg, who contended only that ‘there is thinking going on’ and that I am not entitled to conclude ‘I exist’, as this implies a connection to a substance to which the thoughts belong.
The ‘thin reading’ of the cogito proposes that the ‘I’ refers only to the thoughts that are present in the course of the cogito investigation (nothing can be said of past or future), so it follows that Lichtenberg’s objection would not be applicable here, except in questioning why a stream of thoughts should be called an ‘I’.
However, Descartes contradicts the ‘thin reading’ by saying ‘a thought cannot exist without a thing that is thinking... no act or accident can exist without a substance for it to belong to’ I then conclude that I am a thinking substance, but there are no claims about its connection to the body. A third interpretation of the cogito is that it is an immaterial thinking substance, distinct from the body. This interpretation has been rejected in several places, however in the Sixth Meditation Descartes builds upon the Second to reach the conclusion that mind and body are separate.
‘I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.’ It is true that when thinking, I am unable to deny my own existence; it is analogous to answering ‘absent’ when the register is called in a class.
This is a pragmatic paradox- ‘by attempting to doubt that you exist, you produce evidence to the contrary’ . In this way, the conclusion is reached in a non-inferential manner (without the need for more evidence), and is recognised as self-evident by a ‘simple intuition’ of the mind. A simple intuition is something that can be ‘seen all at once’- in this case, the act of a single thought gives the awareness of the existence of a thinking thing .
However, some prefer to think of the cogito as a logical argument or syllogism (an argument by deductive inference). In this case, an additional premise is required:
P1. ?
P2. I think
C. I exist
The additional major premise (P1) could be: Whatever thinks, exists.
Descartes does not agree that P1 is required, as it is experienced by the meditator to be true. However, if Descartes is allowing a ‘thinking-substance’, he may claim that thoughts can only exist within a substance. In this case, an additional premise concerning this ‘substance’ seems necessary:
P1. Whatever thinks exists
P2. No act or accident can exist without belonging to a substance
P3. I think
C. I exist as a substance that thinks.
Descartes claims P1 and P2, collectively the ‘major premise’, ‘appears so evident to the understanding that we cannot but believe it, even though this might be the first time in our life we have thought of it.’ But these premises aren’t mentioned in Meditation Two, and under methodological doubt we should not believe anything, even what appears evident. If these premises are needed for the cogito, the inference seems to fail as presupposing P1 and P2 contradicts methodological doubt.
In response, Descartes says ‘I think, therefore I am’ contains an implicit ‘major premise’, which might be learned from the meditator’s own case as her experience of thinking serves as a single piece of evidence for existing. ‘Everything needed is grasped in a single intuitive act of thought’ rather than through a syllogism. The use of ‘I am, I exist’ in the Meditations, as opposed to ‘I am thinking, therefore I exist’ is important to note, as neither ‘therefore’, nor ‘I think’ appear in the text, which dissuades the meditator from reading the cogito as a syllogism. So P1 and P2 are implicitly assumed in reaching the conclusion; this is accepted by the meditator, and then it can be analysed to discover its logical structure.
The cogito offers me the first certainty about anything, and shows a way of attaining knowledge without falling into the sceptic’s conclusion.
Conclusion
In this essay, I have examined how Descartes attempted to defeat the sceptic. I have done this by looking at scepticism, examining Methodological Doubt, and discussing the idea that our sense, authority and reason can be fooled. I have discussed the ‘Criterion of Truth’ postulated by Descartes and I discovered one belief that is immune to all possible doubt- ‘I think, I exist’ or ‘Cogito ergo sum’. I think the conclusion does indeed refute scepticism by providing a proposition known with complete certainty, however many objections have been made in various ways about the cogito, and the nature of the cogito is still in ongoing debate.